DCT

1:20-cv-01240

Media Content Protection LLC v. Dell Tech Inc

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I. Executive Summary and Procedural Information

  • Parties & Counsel:
  • Case Identification: 1:20-cv-01240, D. Del., 08/30/2022
  • Venue Allegations: Venue is alleged to be proper in the District of Delaware because Defendants are incorporated in the State of Delaware.
  • Core Dispute: Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s digital video-capable devices that support the HDCP 2.0 protocol infringe four patents related to secure, authenticated distance measurement for controlling the delivery of protected content.
  • Technical Context: The technology at issue falls within the field of Digital Rights Management (DRM), specifically addressing methods to verify the physical proximity of a device before permitting it to receive or display protected digital content.
  • Key Procedural History: The complaint alleges Defendant received notice of the asserted patents via a letter dated September 16, 2020. It also references an earlier letter from March 21, 2014, concerning related patents. Notably, U.S. Patent No. 9,436,809, one of the asserted patents, survived an Inter Partes Review (IPR) proceeding, with a certificate issuing on June 10, 2024, confirming the patentability of asserted claims 1 and others.

Case Timeline

Date Event
2002-07-26 Earliest Priority Date for all Asserted Patents
2014-03-21 First notice letter sent to Defendant regarding related patents
2016-09-06 U.S. Patent 9436809 Issues
2017-03-07 U.S. Patent 9590977 Issues
2018-10-02 U.S. Patent 10091186 Issues
2019-05-21 U.S. Patent 10298564 Issues
2020-09-16 Second notice letter sent to Defendant regarding Asserted Patents
2022-08-30 First Amended Complaint Filed
2024-06-10 Inter Partes Review Certificate issues for U.S. Patent 9,436,809

II. Technology and Patent(s)-in-Suit Analysis

U.S. Patent No. 9,436,809 - "Secure Authenticated Distance Measurement"

  • Patent Identification: U.S. Patent No. 9,436,809, titled "Secure Authenticated Distance Measurement," issued on September 6, 2016 (Compl. ¶6).

The Invention Explained

  • Problem Addressed: The patent addresses the ease of creating perfect, unauthorized copies of digital media, which discourages content owners from allowing distribution over versatile interfaces like Ethernet (’809 Patent, col. 1:49-61). A specific challenge is enabling a legitimate user to view their content on a nearby device, such as a neighbor's television, without opening the door to widespread piracy (’809 Patent, col. 2:20-24).
  • The Patented Solution: The invention proposes a system that combines device authentication with physical distance measurement. A content-source device permits data transfer only after confirming that a receiving device is both compliant with a set of rules and physically close. This is accomplished by measuring the round-trip time of a signal that is modified by a shared secret, thereby ensuring the measurement is secure and performed with the correct device (’809 Patent, Abstract; col. 4:1-9).
  • Technical Importance: This method provides a technical control to enforce proximity-based DRM, potentially enabling secure, short-range content sharing scenarios that would otherwise be considered too risky by content holders (’809 Patent, col. 2:25-33).

Key Claims at a Glance

  • The complaint asserts independent claims 1, 17, and 49 (Compl. ¶25).
  • The essential elements of independent claim 1 include:
    • A first device comprising a memory and a processor arranged to:
    • receive a certificate from a second device and determine if it is compliant with compliance rules;
    • provide a first signal to the compliant second device;
    • receive a second signal from the second device;
    • determine if the second signal is derived from a secret known by the first device;
    • determine if a time difference (between providing the first signal and receiving the second) is less than a predetermined time; and
    • allow protected content to be provided to the second device only when the secret and time conditions are met.

U.S. Patent No. 10,091,186 - "Secure Authenticated Distance Measurement"

  • Patent Identification: U.S. Patent No. 10,091,186, titled "Secure Authenticated Distance Measurement," issued on October 2, 2018 (Compl. ¶7).

The Invention Explained

  • Problem Addressed: As a continuation in the same family as the ’809 Patent, this patent addresses the same fundamental problem of preventing unauthorized distribution of high-quality digital content (’186 Patent, col. 1:42-61).
  • The Patented Solution: The patent describes a method for a first (source) device to control content delivery. The device first receives and validates a certificate from a second (receiving) device to ensure compliance. If compliant, it engages in a secure, time-based protocol involving a shared secret to verify proximity before allowing the protected content to be sent, thereby tying access rights to physical location (’186 Patent, Abstract; col. 4:1-12).
  • Technical Importance: The technology combines cryptographic authentication with a physical-layer check (distance bounding), offering a more granular control mechanism for DRM than authentication alone (’186 Patent, col. 2:41-54).

Key Claims at a Glance

  • The complaint asserts independent claim 1 (Compl. ¶31).
  • The essential elements of independent claim 1 include:
    • A first device with a processor circuit arranged to execute instructions to:
    • receive a second device certificate prior to sending a first signal;
    • provide the first signal to the second device if the certificate indicates compliance;
    • receive a second signal from the second device; and
    • provide protected content to the second device if the second signal is derived from a secret and the time between providing the first signal and receiving the second signal is less than a predetermined time.

U.S. Patent No. 9,590,977 - "Secure Authenticated Distance Measurement"

  • Patent Identification: U.S. Patent No. 9,590,977, titled "Secure Authenticated Distance Measurement," issued on March 7, 2017 (Compl. ¶8).

Technology Synopsis

This patent, from the same family, discloses a method and device for receiving protected content. The receiving device provides a certificate for authentication and, if compliant, participates in a proximity verification exchange using a shared secret. A secure channel is then used to receive the content, ensuring the recipient is both authorized and physically nearby (’977 Patent, Abstract; col. 7:1-24).

Asserted Claims

Independent claims 1 and 11 are asserted (Compl. ¶37).

Accused Features

The complaint alleges that Dell's video-capable devices, such as the Dell UltraSharp monitor, infringe by implementing content protection protocols like HDCP 2.0, which allegedly perform the claimed steps of authenticated, distance-bound content reception (Compl. ¶21, 38).

U.S. Patent No. 10,298,564 - "Secure Authenticated Distance Measurement"

  • Patent Identification: U.S. Patent No. 10,298,564, titled "Secure Authenticated Distance Measurement," issued on May 21, 2019 (Compl. ¶9).

Technology Synopsis

Also from the same patent family, this patent focuses on the method from the perspective of the second (receiving) device. The receiving device provides its certificate, receives a signal from a source device, and creates a second signal derived from a shared secret. It then receives the protected content only after the source device confirms both the secret-based derivation and that the exchange occurred within a time limit corresponding to close proximity (’564 Patent, Abstract; col. 7:4-26).

Asserted Claims

Independent claim 1 is asserted (Compl. ¶43).

Accused Features

Dell's devices supporting HDCP 2.0 and above, exemplified by the Dell UltraSharp monitor, are accused of infringing by performing the claimed receiving-side functions for secure, proximity-verified content transfer (Compl. ¶21, 44).

III. The Accused Instrumentality

Product Identification

The complaint targets a wide range of "digital video-capable devices" sold by Dell, including but not limited to laptops (Alienware, Inspiron, G-Series, Latitude, Chromebook, XPS), desktops, monitors (Alienware, S-Series, UltraSharp), projectors, and docking stations (Compl. ¶21). The infringement allegations center on any such product that supports the "HDCP 2.0 protocol and above" (Compl. ¶21).

Functionality and Market Context

The accused functionality is the implementation of the High-Bandwidth Digital Content Protection (HDCP) 2.0 standard and subsequent versions. The complaint alleges that the standard operations of this protocol for authenticating devices and establishing a secure connection for video streams constitute infringement of the asserted patents (Compl. ¶21). These features are positioned as standard in a broad array of Dell's consumer and professional electronics, making them commercially significant (Compl. ¶21).

IV. Analysis of Infringement Allegations

The complaint references claim chart exhibits (Exhibits E, F, G, and H) to detail its infringement allegations but does not include them in the filing (Compl. ¶26, 32, 38, 44). The following is a prose summary of the infringement theory.

No probative visual evidence provided in complaint.

The core infringement theory is that Dell products implementing the HDCP 2.0 (and above) standard necessarily practice the methods claimed in the asserted patents. The complaint alleges that the HDCP protocol's process for establishing a secure link between a source (e.g., a laptop) and a sink (e.g., a monitor) maps onto the patented claims. This process includes an authentication phase, a locality check to prevent content repeaters, and the exchange of secret keys to encrypt the content stream (Compl. ¶21, 26, 32). Plaintiff's theory appears to equate the HDCP authentication with the claimed "compliant certificate" step, the HDCP locality check with the claimed "distance measurement," and the HDCP key exchange and encryption with the use of a "secret" to derive signals and provide content.

  • Identified Points of Contention:
    • Scope Questions: A primary point of contention may arise over the meaning of "distance measurement." The patents describe measuring a signal's physical "round trip time" ('809 Patent, col. 5:42-44), whereas the HDCP 2.0 locality check measures network topology (e.g., hop count) rather than physical time-of-flight. The dispute may center on whether the logical check performed by HDCP meets the claim limitation of determining a "time difference... less than a predetermined time."
    • Technical Questions: A technical question is whether the cryptographic operations in the HDCP standard can be fairly characterized as "deriving" a signal from a secret in the manner claimed. The patents teach modifying a signal directly with the secret, such as through an XOR operation ('809 Patent, col. 5:57-62). The court may need to determine if the complex cryptographic handshake in HDCP is functionally equivalent to the specific modification method disclosed and claimed.

V. Key Claim Terms for Construction

  • The Term: "determine whether a time difference ... is less than a predetermined time" ('809 Patent, cl. 1; '186 Patent, cl. 1).

  • Context and Importance: This term is the crux of the distance-bounding feature. Its construction will likely determine whether the HDCP 2.0 "locality check" can infringe. Practitioners may focus on this term because if it is construed to require direct measurement of physical signal propagation time, it may not read on the accused protocol, which measures logical network hops.

  • Intrinsic Evidence for Interpretation:

    • Evidence for a Broader Interpretation: The claim language itself does not explicitly state the "time difference" must result from a physical time-of-flight measurement, which could support an argument that any reliable, time-based proxy for proximity is covered.
    • Evidence for a Narrower Interpretation: The specification consistently frames the invention in the context of physical proximity, stating the goal is to prove a device is "near" another ('186 Patent, col. 2:28-29). It further describes the measurement of a "round trip time between the signal leaving and the signal returning," which points toward a physical, not logical, measurement ('186 Patent, col. 5:42-45).

  • The Term: "the second signal is derived from a secret" ('809 Patent, cl. 1; '186 Patent, cl. 1).

  • Context and Importance: This limitation connects the authentication aspect (the "secret") with the signal used for verification. The infringement analysis depends on whether the use of session keys in the HDCP protocol constitutes "deriving" a signal as claimed.

  • Intrinsic Evidence for Interpretation:

    • Evidence for a Broader Interpretation: The term "derived from" is facially broad. An argument could be made that any output signal whose state depends on the secret as an input, even through a complex cryptographic function, is "derived from" it.
    • Evidence for a Narrower Interpretation: The specification discloses a specific embodiment where a signal is "modified by XORing the chips ... of the direct sequence code by the bits of the secret" ('809 Patent, col. 5:57-62). This specific example of direct modification could be used to argue for a narrower construction that excludes more complex cryptographic transformations where the secret is one of many inputs.

VI. Other Allegations

  • Indirect Infringement: The complaint focuses on direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) and (g) (Compl. ¶20). It does not plead separate counts for indirect infringement or allege specific facts supporting inducement or contributory infringement, such as instructions in user manuals that would guide users to perform the claimed methods.
  • Willful Infringement: The complaint alleges that Dell had actual notice of the asserted patents at least as early as September 16, 2020, through a letter from Philips (Compl. ¶19). It further alleges notice from the filing of the original and amended complaints. Willfulness is based on Dell's alleged continued infringement after receiving these notices (Compl. ¶20). The prayer for relief seeks enhanced damages and a finding that the case is exceptional (Compl. p. 10, ¶(g), (i)).

VII. Analyst’s Conclusion: Key Questions for the Case

  • A core issue will be one of technical scope: can the claim limitation "determine whether a time difference... is less than a predetermined time," which the patent specification ties to physical signal propagation, be construed to cover the logical network-hop "locality check" implemented in the accused HDCP 2.0 standard?
  • A key evidentiary question will be one of functional correspondence: does the complex cryptographic handshake in the HDCP protocol perform the specific, claimed step of "deriving" a response signal "from a secret," or is there a fundamental mismatch between the accused industry standard's operation and the patented method?
  • A significant legal dynamic will be the impact of the '809 patent's IPR survival: how will the PTO's confirmation of the patentability of asserted claims in the face of a validity challenge affect the parties' litigation strategies, settlement posture, and the court's view of Dell's invalidity defenses for the entire patent family?