DCT
1:20-cv-01243
Media Content Protection LLC v. Intel Corp
I. Executive Summary and Procedural Information
- Parties & Counsel:
- Plaintiff: Media Content Protection LLC (Delaware)
- Defendant: Intel Corp. (Delaware)
- Plaintiff’s Counsel: Farnan LLP; Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C.
- Case Identification: 1:20-cv-01243, D. Del., 09/23/2024
- Venue Allegations: Venue is alleged to be proper because Defendant is a Delaware corporation that resides in the district and has allegedly committed acts of infringement there.
- Core Dispute: Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s processors and associated firmware, which support the High-bandwidth Digital Content Protection (HDCP) 2.0 protocol and above, infringe patents related to secure, proximity-based delivery of protected digital content.
- Technical Context: The technology concerns digital rights management (DRM) for securely transmitting high-definition content between devices (e.g., over an HDMI connection) while preventing unauthorized copying by verifying that the receiving device is within a limited physical distance.
- Key Procedural History: The complaint alleges that Defendant had pre-suit knowledge of the asserted patents and its infringement due to prior litigation initiated by the patents' original owner (Philips) against Defendant’s customers, subpoenas served on Defendant in those cases, and an International Trade Commission (ITC) investigation that allegedly found infringement by a version of Defendant's software.
Case Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 2002-07-26 | Priority Date for ’809 and ’186 Patents |
| 2014-11-11 | ’809 Patent Application Filed |
| 2016-09-06 | ’809 Patent Issued |
| 2016-11-16 | ’186 Patent Application Filed |
| 2016-11-23 | Plaintiff's predecessor-in-interest allegedly notifies Intel of '809 Patent via suits against Intel's customers |
| 2017-01-12 | Plaintiff's predecessor allegedly notifies Intel's customer Lenovo of '809 Patent |
| 2018-01-23 | Plaintiff's predecessor serves subpoena on Intel regarding '809 Patent |
| 2018-05-29 | Plaintiff's predecessor again allegedly notifies Intel's customer Lenovo of '809 Patent |
| 2018-10-02 | ’186 Patent Issued |
| 2019-07-31 | Plaintiff's predecessor allegedly notifies Intel's customer LG of Asserted Patents |
| 2020-02-20 | Plaintiff's predecessor again allegedly notifies Intel's customer LG of Asserted Patents |
| 2020-09-17 | Plaintiff provides Defendant with actual notice of the Asserted Patents via letter |
| 2021-07-01 | Defendant publishes "Errata" to its HDCP 2.3 technology |
| 2024-09-23 | Second Amended Complaint Filed |
II. Technology and Patent(s)-in-Suit Analysis
U.S. Patent No. 9,436,809 - "Secure Authenticated Distance Measurement"
The Invention Explained
- Problem Addressed: The patent describes the challenge of preventing unauthorized copying of digital content, particularly in networked environments where content could be transmitted to devices outside a user's immediate vicinity, such as a neighbor's television. Existing secure channel technologies did not solve the problem of enforcing proximity-based licenses. (’809 Patent, col. 2:13-28).
- The Patented Solution: The invention proposes a method that combines device authentication with a physical distance check. A first device (content source) and a second device (content receiver) first establish a shared "common secret." The first device then sends a signal to the second, which modifies the signal using the secret and transmits it back. By measuring the round-trip time of this secret-dependent exchange, the first device can securely verify the distance to the authenticated second device, ensuring content is not being sent to a distant, unauthorized receiver. (’809 Patent, Abstract; col. 2:40-57).
- Technical Importance: This method provides a mechanism for content owners to enforce DRM rules based on physical proximity, a crucial element for licensing high-value media in connected home entertainment systems. (’809 Patent, col. 2:20-28).
Key Claims at a Glance
- The complaint asserts independent claims 1, 17, and 49. (Compl. ¶36).
- Essential elements of independent claim 1 include:
- A first device comprising a memory and a processor arranged to:
- receive a certificate of the second device;
- determine whether the second device is compliant with a set of compliance rules;
- provide a first signal to the second device depending when the second device is determined to be compliant;
- receive a second signal from the second device;
- determine whether the second signal is derived from a secret known by the first device;
- determine whether a time difference between providing the first and receiving the second signal is less than a predetermined time; and
- allow the protected content to be provided to the second device when the signal is derived from the secret and the time difference is less than the predetermined time.
U.S. Patent No. 10,091,186 - "Secure Authenticated Distance Measurement"
The Invention Explained
- Problem Addressed: As a continuation of the same patent family, the ’186 Patent addresses the same technical problem as the ’809 Patent: the need to control digital content distribution by securely verifying the physical proximity of a receiving device. (’186 Patent, col. 2:20-30).
- The Patented Solution: The patented solution is functionally identical to that of the ’809 Patent, involving a secure, authenticated distance measurement protocol. The method relies on a shared secret between two devices and a round-trip signal time measurement to confirm that the devices are within a limited distance before protected content is transferred. (’186 Patent, Abstract; col. 2:41-61).
- Technical Importance: The technology enables proximity-based DRM, allowing content providers to create licenses that restrict playback to a specific physical area, such as a single room. (’186 Patent, col. 2:20-30).
Key Claims at a Glance
- The complaint asserts independent claim 1. (Compl. ¶45).
- Essential elements of independent claim 1 include:
- A first device comprising a processor circuit arranged to execute instructions to:
- receive a second device certificate from the second device prior to sending a first signal;
- provide the first signal to the second device when the certificate indicates compliance with a compliance rule;
- receive a second signal from the second device;
- provide protected content to the second device when the second signal is derived from a secret and the time between providing the first signal and receiving the second signal is less than a predetermined time;
- wherein the secret is known by the first device.
III. The Accused Instrumentality
Product Identification
The Accused Products are identified as Intel’s digital video-capable integrated circuits and associated firmware that support the HDCP 2.0 protocol and above ("HDCP 2+"). (Compl. ¶17). This includes, but is not limited to, Intel 6th through 10th Generation processors (e.g., Skylake, Kaby Lake, Coffee Lake, Ice Lake) and later generations. (Compl. ¶17).
Functionality and Market Context
The complaint alleges that the Accused Products are incorporated into a wide range of consumer electronics, such as laptops and PCs from Dell, HP, and Lenovo. (Compl. ¶14). The accused functionality is the implementation of the HDCP 2+ standard, which manages the secure transmission of protected audio-visual content. (Compl. ¶17). A key component of this standard, as alleged in the complaint's exhibits, is a "Locality Check" protocol designed to ensure that the receiving device is physically proximate to the transmitting device. (Compl. Ex. C, p. 16). The complaint contains an image of a Dell laptop with the accused Intel processor, highlighting the HDMI port used for transmitting protected content. (Compl. Ex. C, p. 51).
IV. Analysis of Infringement Allegations
'809 Patent Infringement Allegations
| Claim Element (from Independent Claim 1) | Alleged Infringing Functionality | Complaint Citation | Patent Citation |
|---|---|---|---|
| receive a certificate of the second device... | The processor receives a certificate ("certrx") from the receiving device as part of the HDCP 2.2 Authentication and Key Exchange (AKE) stage. | Ex. C, p. 15 | col. 5:67-6:3 |
| determine whether the second device is compliant with a set of compliance rules... | The processor verifies the signature on the certificate and checks if the receiver is on a revocation list to determine compliance with HDCP rules. | Ex. C, p. 19 | col. 7:13-17 |
| provide a first signal to the second device depending when the second device is determined to be compliant... | After successful authentication, the processor sends an "LC_Init" message containing a 64-bit random number ("rn") to the receiver to begin the Locality Check. | Ex. C, p. 23 | col. 7:18-22 |
| receive a second signal from the second device... | The processor receives an "LC_Send_L_prime" message containing a value "L'" from the receiver in response to the first signal. | Ex. C, p. 28 | col. 7:23-25 |
| determine whether the second signal is derived from a secret known by the first device... | The processor computes its own value "L" using a shared secret (a derivative of the master key "km") and compares it to the received "L'" to verify it was derived from the secret. | Ex. C, p. 32 | col. 7:26-28 |
| determine whether a time difference between providing the first signal and receiving the second signal is less than a predetermined time... | The HDCP protocol requires the "LC_Send_L_prime" message to be received within a predetermined 20-millisecond watchdog timer timeout. | Ex. C, p. 40 | col. 7:29-34 |
| allow the protected content to be provided to the second device when at least the second signal is determined to be derived from the secret and the time difference is less than the predetermined time. | The processor proceeds to subsequent stages of the HDCP protocol, including content encryption and transmission, only after the Locality Check (which includes both the secret and time checks) is successfully completed. | Ex. C, p. 43 | col. 7:35-41 |
'186 Patent Infringement Allegations
| Claim Element (from Independent Claim 1) | Alleged Infringing Functionality | Complaint Citation | Patent Citation |
|---|---|---|---|
| receive a second device certificate from the second device prior to sending a first signal; | The processor executes instructions to receive the "certrx" during the AKE stage before initiating the Locality Check by sending the "LC_Init" message. | Ex. D, p. 15 | col. 7:10-12 |
| provide the first signal to the second device when the second device certificate indicates that the second device is compliant with at least one compliance rule; | The processor executes instructions to provide the "LC_Init" message after determining from the certificate that the receiver is compliant with HDCP rules. | Ex. D, p. 21 | col. 7:13-16 |
| receive a second signal from the second device after providing the first signal; and | The processor executes instructions to receive the "LC_Send_L_prime" message from the receiver in response to the "LC_Init" message. | Ex. D, p. 26 | col. 7:17-19 |
| provide the protected content to the second device when the second signal is derived from a secret and a time between the providing of the first signal and the receiving of the second signal is less than a predetermined time, | The processor executes instructions to provide content only after verifying that the received "L'" value was derived from the shared secret and that the exchange occurred within the 20ms timeout. | Ex. D, p. 29 | col. 7:19-25 |
| wherein the secret is known by the first device. | The processor executes instructions using the master key "km" (or derivatives thereof), which it generates and/or stores, as the secret for the Locality Check. | Ex. D, p. 39 | col. 7:26-26 |
Identified Points of Contention
- Scope Questions: A potential point of contention may be whether the HDCP 2+ protocol's "locality check," which uses a fixed pass/fail time limit (e.g., 20 ms) primarily to prevent man-in-the-middle relay attacks, constitutes the "distance measurement" contemplated by the patents. The complaint's evidence shows the HDCP protocol uses a state diagram for authentication. (Compl. Ex. C, p. 59). The defense may argue that this is a binary proximity check, not a "measurement" designed to calculate a specific distance as the patent specification suggests.
- Technical Questions: The complaint alleges that the HDCP protocol's generation of the value "L'" using a secret key and a random nonce as inputs to a cryptographic hash function (HMAC-SHA256) meets the claim limitation of determining if a "second signal is derived from a secret." A question for the court will be whether this complex cryptographic generation is equivalent to the patent's described embodiments of "modifying the first signal" (e.g., via an XOR operation).
V. Key Claim Terms for Construction
The Term: "determine whether a time difference ... is less than a predetermined time" (’809 Patent, Claim 1)
Context and Importance: This term is central to the infringement analysis. The accused HDCP protocol uses a 20ms watchdog timer. The dispute may turn on whether using a timer to see if a response arrives within a set period is the same as "determining a time difference." Practitioners may focus on this term because Intel may argue its system performs a pass/fail check, not an actual measurement and comparison of a "time difference."
Intrinsic Evidence for Interpretation:
- Evidence for a Broader Interpretation: The plain language does not mandate a specific method of calculation. An interpretation that any mechanism establishing that an event occurred within a time window "determines" the time difference is less than the window's duration may be advanced.
- Evidence for a Narrower Interpretation: The specification repeatedly links the time difference to "measuring the distance" and "calculating the distance." (’809 Patent, col. 3:4-12; col. 6:33-34). This language could support an interpretation that an active calculation of the round-trip time is required, not merely a check against a fixed timeout period.
The Term: "determine whether the second signal is derived from a secret" (’809 Patent, Claim 1)
Context and Importance: The infringement theory depends on mapping the HDCP protocol's cryptographic functions to this claim element. The definition will determine whether a complex hash function using the secret as one of several inputs is equivalent to the patent's simpler concept of modifying a signal with a secret.
Intrinsic Evidence for Interpretation:
- Evidence for a Broader Interpretation: The phrase "derived from" is facially broad and could encompass any process where the secret is a necessary input to produce the output. The complaint shows a key derivation function that uses the secret. (Compl. Ex. C, p. 83).
- Evidence for a Narrower Interpretation: The specification's preferred embodiment describes a direct "modification" of the first signal, specifically "performing an exclusive OR operation (XOR) between the bit words." (’809 Patent, col. 3:29-32). This could support a narrower construction limited to direct transformations of the first signal, rather than generating a new value through a hash function where the first signal is an input.
VI. Other Allegations
- Indirect Infringement: The complaint alleges that Defendant induces infringement by advertising HDCP 2+ support and providing its processors and firmware to customers (e.g., Dell, HP) with the knowledge and intent that they will be incorporated into devices that practice the claimed methods. (Compl. ¶¶29-30). It further alleges contributory infringement on the basis that the Accused Products are a material part of the invention, are especially adapted for infringing use, and have no substantial non-infringing use. (Compl. ¶31).
- Willful Infringement: The complaint makes extensive allegations to support willfulness. It alleges Defendant had knowledge of the ’809 Patent as early as November 2016 through litigation against its customers (Compl. ¶20), was served with a subpoena regarding the patent in 2018 (Compl. ¶21), and received further notice through its customers Lenovo and LG. (Compl. ¶¶22, 24). The complaint also alleges Defendant was aware of the ’186 Patent upon its issuance due to monitoring its parent patent. (Compl. ¶23). Finally, it alleges that Defendant’s attempts to design around the patents were unsuccessful and found to infringe in a separate ITC investigation, suggesting a lack of a good-faith belief of non-infringement. (Compl. ¶¶26-27).
VII. Analyst’s Conclusion: Key Questions for the Case
- A core issue will be one of definitional scope: can the phrase "determine whether a time difference... is less than a predetermined time," which is linked in the patent specification to measuring distance, be construed to cover the HDCP 2+ protocol's use of a fixed watchdog timer designed to ensure locality and prevent relay attacks?
- A key evidentiary question will be one of technical implementation: does the accused HDCP protocol's use of a secret key as an input to a complex cryptographic hash function (HMAC-SHA256) to generate a new verification value meet the claim limitation of determining whether a received signal is "derived from a secret" by "modifying the first signal"?
- A central focus of the damages and willfulness case will be on knowledge and intent: based on the extensive history of prior litigation, subpoenas, and customer notifications alleged in the complaint, the court will need to determine what Intel knew regarding its potential infringement and when, and whether its actions constitute the "wanton and malicious" conduct required for enhanced damages.