Agilent Technologies Inc

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Entered	Case	Description
02/19/25	Agilent Technologies Inc v. Axion Biosystems Inc 1:23-CV-00198 ( D. DE )	ORAL ORDER: The Court has reviewed the portion of Defendant’s partial motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) (the “Motion”), (D.I. [87] ), via which Defendant moves to dismiss Counts VI and VII of the SAC (which allege California state law claims for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage (or “IIPEA”) and negligent interference with prospective economic advantage (or “NIPEA”), respectively) on the ground that Plaintiff failed to plead facts alleging that Defendant committed a “wrongful act” independent of the interference itself (or an act grounded in tort). (D.I. [88] at 13-18) It has also reviewed the briefing related to this portion of the Motion. (D.I. [88] ; D.I. [99] ; D.I. [101] ) Having done so, the Court hereby ORDERS that this portion of the Motion is GRANTED for the reasons and in the manner that follows: (1) As an initial matter, the Court agrees with Defendant, (D.I. [101] at 7), that in order to successfully plead both an IIPEA claim and a NIPEA claim, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant engaged in an act that was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself (the “wrongful act” or the “wrongful act requirement”), as both California state courts and federal courts interpreting California law have consistently noted that the wrongful act requirement applies to both types of claims. See Redfearn v. Trader Joe’s Co., 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 98, 111 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018); Contemp. Servs. Corp. v. Staff Pro Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 434, 449 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007); see also Soil Retention Prods., Inc. v. Brentwood Indus., Inc., 521 F. Supp. 3d 929, 961 (S.D. Cal. 2021); Oumere LLC v. Zarpas, Case No. 8:21-cv-00224-DOC(JDEx), 2021 WL 2894643, at 5 (C.D. Cal. June 29, 2021). In this context, an act is independently wrongful if it is unlawful; that is, if it was proscribed by some constitutional, statutory, regulatory, common law, or other determinable legal standard. See Redfearn, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 111; (2) In its briefing, Plaintiff at times suggests that the relevant pleaded independent wrongful act(s) as to these claims are Defendant’s alleged acts of trade secret misappropriation (“TSM”). (D.I. [99] at 17, 20) But for reasons the Court has previously explained, (see D.I. 302 ), Plaintiff cannot rely on TSM-related activity in order to make out its claims in Counts VI and VII. That is because were Plaintiff to do so, these claims would be preempted by CUTSA. (Id.) Instead, in such a circumstance, the Court must “remove[]” the factual allegations relating to TSM from Counts VI and VII and ask: Is there still a viable claim for IIPEA or NIPEA here? See Aavid Thermalloy LLC v. Cooler Master Co., Case No. 17-cv-05363-JSW, 2018 WL 11348438, at 3 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2018); see also Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. v. Tarantino, 498 F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2020).; (3) Plaintiff next argues that it has sufficiently pleaded the wrongful act requirement in light of its allegations that “Axion recruited Dr. Ferrick for the role of Chief Scientific Officer, knowing that he was a high-level employee of [a] direct competitor, Agilent.” (D.I. [99] at 17 (additionally referencing Defendant’s “recruitment of Dr. Ferrick” as being relevant here)) But as Defendant points out, (D.I. [101] at 8-9), California law makes clear that merely extending a job offer that induces another party’s employee to terminate their at-will employment cannot amount to a qualifying wrongful act. See Ixchel Pharma, LLC v. Biogen, Inc., 9 Cal. 5th 1130, 1148 (Cal. 2020); Reeves v. Hanlon, 95 P.3d 513, 520 (Cal. 2004); see also Aclate, Inc. v. Eclipse Mktg. LLC, Civil Action No. 20-576-RGA, 2020 WL 6158579, at 6 (D. Del. Oct. 21, 2020). So Defendant’s acts in hiring Dr. Ferrick away from its competitor, Plaintiff, cannot meet the wrongful act requirement either.; (4) In a final effort to explain why it has pleaded the required wrongful act, Plaintiff notes that it has alleged that “through Dr. Ferrick, Axion interfered with Agilent’s contractual relationship with Dr. Ferrick.” (D.I. [99] at 18) But this allegation is also insufficient, as California law does not “recognize a breach of contract as a ‘wrongful act’ predicate” for IIPEA or NIPEA claims, New Box Sols., LLC v. Davis, CV 18-5324-RSWL-KSx, 2018 WL 4562764, at 8 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2018), which would include any assertion that a party (like Defendant) aided and abetted or induced such a breach of contract, cf.In re Mark One Corp., 619 B.R. 423, 438 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2020); AMN Healthcare, Inc. v. Aya Healthcare Servs., Inc., 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d 577, 598 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018). Nor was Plaintiff’s response on this point persuasive. (D.I. [99] at 19 n.7); (5) Plaintiff’s pleading and briefing does not suggest—nor can the Court discern—how it can possibly plead the requisite wrongful act in any subsequent complaint. Therefore, dismissal of Counts VI and VII shall be with prejudice.; and (6) With the Motion now fully resolved, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to further amend the SAC to re-allege Count V, (see D.I. 299 ), it shall file a motion for leave to amend along with a proposed new complaint by no later than 14 days from today’s date. Ordered by Judge Christopher J. Burke on 02/19/2025. (smg) (Entered: 02/19/2025) ORAL ORDER: The Court has reviewed the portion of Defendant’s partial motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) (the “Motion”), (D.I. [87] ), via which Defendant moves to dismiss Counts VI and VII of the SAC (which allege California state law claims for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage (or “IIPEA”) and negligent interference with prospective economic advantage (or “NIPEA”), respectively) on the ground that Plaintiff failed to plead facts alleging that Defendant committed a “wrongful act” independent of the interference itself (or an act grounded in tort). (D.I. [88] at 13-18) It has also reviewed the briefing related to this portion of the Motion. (D.I. [88] ; D.I. [99] ; D.I. [101] ) Having done so, the Court hereby ORDERS that this portion of the Motion is GRANTED for the reasons and in the manner that follows: (1) As an initial matter, the Court agrees with Defendant, (D.I. [101] at 7), that in order to successfully plead both an IIPEA claim and a NIPEA claim, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant engaged in an act that was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself (the “wrongful act” or the “wrongful act requirement”), as both California state courts and federal courts interpreting California law have consistently noted that the wrongful act requirement applies to both types of claims. See Redfearn v. Trader Joe’s Co., 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 98, 111 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018); Contemp. Servs. Corp. v. Staff Pro Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 434, 449 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007); see also Soil Retention Prods., Inc. v. Brentwood Indus., Inc., 521 F. Supp. 3d 929, 961 (S.D. Cal. 2021); Oumere LLC v. Zarpas, Case No. 8:21-cv-00224-DOC(JDEx), 2021 WL 2894643, at 5 (C.D. Cal. June 29, 2021). In this context, an act is independently wrongful if it is unlawful; that is, if it was proscribed by some constitutional, statutory, regulatory, common law, or other determinable legal standard. See Redfearn, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 111; (2) In its briefing, Plaintiff at times suggests that the relevant pleaded independent wrongful act(s) as to these claims are Defendant’s alleged acts of trade secret misappropriation (“TSM”). (D.I. [99] at 17, 20) But for reasons the Court has previously explained, (see D.I. 302 ), Plaintiff cannot rely on TSM-related activity in order to make out its claims in Counts VI and VII. That is because were Plaintiff to do so, these claims would be preempted by CUTSA. (Id.) Instead, in such a circumstance, the Court must “remove[]” the factual allegations relating to TSM from Counts VI and VII and ask: Is there still a viable claim for IIPEA or NIPEA here? See Aavid Thermalloy LLC v. Cooler Master Co., Case No. 17-cv-05363-JSW, 2018 WL 11348438, at 3 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2018); see also Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. v. Tarantino, 498 F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2020).; (3) Plaintiff next argues that it has sufficiently pleaded the wrongful act requirement in light of its allegations that “Axion recruited Dr. Ferrick for the role of Chief Scientific Officer, knowing that he was a high-level employee of [a] direct competitor, Agilent.” (D.I. [99] at 17 (additionally referencing Defendant’s “recruitment of Dr. Ferrick” as being relevant here)) But as Defendant points out, (D.I. [101] at 8-9), California law makes clear that merely extending a job offer that induces another party’s employee to terminate their at-will employment cannot amount to a qualifying wrongful act. See Ixchel Pharma, LLC v. Biogen, Inc., 9 Cal. 5th 1130, 1148 (Cal. 2020); Reeves v. Hanlon, 95 P.3d 513, 520 (Cal. 2004); see also Aclate, Inc. v. Eclipse Mktg. LLC, Civil Action No. 20-576-RGA, 2020 WL 6158579, at 6 (D. Del. Oct. 21, 2020). So Defendant’s acts in hiring Dr. Ferrick away from its competitor, Plaintiff, cannot meet the wrongful act requirement either.; (4) In a final effort to explain why it has pleaded the required wrongful act, Plaintiff notes that it has alleged that “through Dr. Ferrick, Axion interfered with Agilent’s contractual relationship with Dr. Ferrick.” (D.I. [99] at 18) But this allegation is also insufficient, as California law does not “recognize a breach of contract as a ‘wrongful act’ predicate” for IIPEA or NIPEA claims, New Box Sols., LLC v. Davis, CV 18-5324-RSWL-KSx, 2018 WL 4562764, at 8 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2018), which would include any assertion that a party (like Defendant) aided and abetted or induced such a breach of contract, cf.In re Mark One Corp., 619 B.R. 423, 438 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2020); AMN Healthcare, Inc. v. Aya Healthcare Servs., Inc., 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d 577, 598 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018). Nor was Plaintiff’s response on this point persuasive. (D.I. [99] at 19 n.7); (5) Plaintiff’s pleading and briefing does not suggest—nor can the Court discern—how it can possibly plead the requisite wrongful act in any subsequent complaint. Therefore, dismissal of Counts VI and VII shall be with prejudice.; and (6) With the Motion now fully resolved, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to further amend the SAC to re-allege Count V, (see D.I. 299 ), it shall file a motion for leave to amend along with a proposed new complaint by no later than 14 days from today’s date. Ordered by Judge Christopher J. Burke on 02/19/2025. (smg) (Entered: 02/19/2025)
02/14/25	Agilent Technologies Inc v. Axion Biosystems Inc 1:23-CV-00198 ( D. DE )	ORAL ORDER: The Court has reviewed the portion of Defendant’s partial motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) (the “Motion”), (D.I. [87] ), via which Defendant moves to dismiss Counts VI and VII of the SAC (which allege California state law claims for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage (or “IIPEA”) and negligent interference with prospective economic advantage (or “NIPEA”), respectively) on the ground that those claims are preempted by the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“CUTSA”). It has also reviewed the briefing related to this Motion. (D.I. [88] ; D.I. [99] ; D.I. [101] ) Having done so, the Court hereby ORDERS that this portion of the Motion is DENIED for the reasons and in the manner that follows: (1) The parties are in agreement that pursuant to California state law, when a party brings non-contractual common law or statutory claims that are “based on the same nucleus of facts as [a claim for] the misappropriation of trade secrets” then those other non-misappropriation claims are preempted by CUTSA (even if the pleading at issue does not itself assert a CUTSA claim). (D.I. [88] at 11; D.I. [99] at 12-13); see also K.C. Multimedia, Inc., v. Bank of Am. Tech. & Operations, Inc., 171 Cal. App. 4th 939, 955, 958-62 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (explaining that CUTSA requires that other claims that are “based upon misappropriation” are preempted, that a court must examine the conduct alleged in such claims to determine whether this is so, and that preemption is required where the other claims “hinge[]” on trade secret misappropriation allegations, or where “the conduct at the heart” of those other claims is the asserted disclosure of trade secrets, or where the “gravamen” of the wrongful conduct in those other claims relates to trade secret misappropriation, or where the other claims “rest[] squarely” on allegations of trade secret misappropriation) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).; (2) Sometimes it is easy to discern whether the “same nucleus of facts” test is met, such as where “identical” facts are pleaded in the non-trade secret misappropriation (“TSM”) claims as are pleaded in the TSM claim. See, e.g., Digit. Envoy, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 370 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1035 (N.D. Cal. 2005).; (3) The instant SAC is a bit more challenging on this front, however. That is because, on the one hand, the IIPEA and NIPEA claims in Counts VI and VII do draw in part on some of the same factual allegations relating to TSM that fuel Count V’s claim for a violation of the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act (i.e., allegations regarding how Plaintiff’s former employee Dr. Ferrick allegedly transferred numerous files containing Plaintiff’s trade secrets to Defendant’s computers), and they do allege that this misappropriation-related activity is also one of the types of economic “disrupt[ion]” or interference at issue in Counts VI and VII. (Compare D.I. [77] at paras. 196 & 198 (Count V), with id., at paras. 215-16 & 218 (Count VI), and with id. at para. 231 (Count VII)) But on the other hand, Counts VI and VII also plead that Defendant “disrupt[ed]” or interfered with Plaintiff’s economic relationships in ways that seem distinct from the TSM-related or misuse-of-confidential information-related allegations found in Count V (i.e., simply by hiring away Dr. Ferrick from Plaintiff, or by causing Dr. Ferrick to breach certain agreements with Plaintiff). (See id. at paras. 212, 217-20); (4) The cases the Court found most helpful were ones that dealt with complaints involving similar facts to what we have here—i.e., cases where a complaint pleaded a TSM claim and California law-based IIPEA or NIPEA claim, and where the IIPEA or NIPEA at least made some reference to alleged economic disruption that did not directly have to do with misappropriating trade secrets. These cases suggested that where the IIPEA or NIPEA claims were not entirely dependent on TSM-related allegations in order to try to make out the necessary case of economic disruption, then such claims should not be deemed preempted by CUTSA. See, e.g., Remedi8, LLC v. Alliance Env’t Grp., LLC, CV 23-05669 TJH (JPRx), 2024 WL 1829617, at 3, 5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2024) (finding that non-contractual claims are not preempted by CUTSA if they also have a factual basis independent of the misappropriation of a trade secret, and concluding that an IIPEA claim was not preempted where it was primarily based on the allegation that defendant had interfered with plaintiff’s relationships with its customers) (citing Angelica Textile Servs., Inc. v. Park, 220 Cal. App. 4th 495, 506 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013)); Cutera, Inc. v. Lutronic Aesthetics, Inc., No. 2:20-CV-00235-KJM-DB, 2020 WL 4937129, at 8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2020) (finding that a claim for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage was not preempted by a CUTSA claim, where the interference claim was premised on the defendant’s alleged hand in prompting several of plaintiff’s employees to leave the company and work for a competitor); Aavid Thermalloy LLC v. Cooler Master Co., Case No. 17-cv-05363-JSW, 2018 WL 11348438, at 3 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2018) (finding that an IIPEA claim was not preempted by a CUTSA claim, where while the plaintiff did allege wrongful acts in the IIPEA claim that amounted to TSM, it also alleged wrongful acts distinct from such misappropriation, and where if the TSM-related conduct were removed from the IIPEA claim, the factual allegations therein could still “support other causes of action”); see also (D.I. [99] at 13).; and (5) In line with the decisions in those cases, which the Court finds persuasive, the Court will deny this portion of the Motion here. More specifically, the Court concludes that Counts VI and VII should not be dismissed on preemption grounds because they are premised, at least in part, on alleged acts of economic disruption that do not directly sound in TSM. The Court will assess Defendant’s remaining basis for dismissal of Counts VI and VII, (D.I. [88] at 13-18), separately and in a forthcoming order. See Cutera, Inc., 2020 WL 4937129, at 8 (going on to assess whether the tortious interference claim, even if not preempted by CUTSA, was nevertheless not well-pled on other grounds). Ordered by Judge Christopher J. Burke on 02/14/2025. (smg) (Entered: 02/14/2025) ORAL ORDER: The Court has reviewed the portion of Defendant’s partial motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) (the “Motion”), (D.I. [87] ), via which Defendant moves to dismiss Counts VI and VII of the SAC (which allege California state law claims for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage (or “IIPEA”) and negligent interference with prospective economic advantage (or “NIPEA”), respectively) on the ground that those claims are preempted by the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“CUTSA”). It has also reviewed the briefing related to this Motion. (D.I. [88] ; D.I. [99] ; D.I. [101] ) Having done so, the Court hereby ORDERS that this portion of the Motion is DENIED for the reasons and in the manner that follows: (1) The parties are in agreement that pursuant to California state law, when a party brings non-contractual common law or statutory claims that are “based on the same nucleus of facts as [a claim for] the misappropriation of trade secrets” then those other non-misappropriation claims are preempted by CUTSA (even if the pleading at issue does not itself assert a CUTSA claim). (D.I. [88] at 11; D.I. [99] at 12-13); see also K.C. Multimedia, Inc., v. Bank of Am. Tech. & Operations, Inc., 171 Cal. App. 4th 939, 955, 958-62 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (explaining that CUTSA requires that other claims that are “based upon misappropriation” are preempted, that a court must examine the conduct alleged in such claims to determine whether this is so, and that preemption is required where the other claims “hinge[]” on trade secret misappropriation allegations, or where “the conduct at the heart” of those other claims is the asserted disclosure of trade secrets, or where the “gravamen” of the wrongful conduct in those other claims relates to trade secret misappropriation, or where the other claims “rest[] squarely” on allegations of trade secret misappropriation) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).; (2) Sometimes it is easy to discern whether the “same nucleus of facts” test is met, such as where “identical” facts are pleaded in the non-trade secret misappropriation (“TSM”) claims as are pleaded in the TSM claim. See, e.g., Digit. Envoy, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 370 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1035 (N.D. Cal. 2005).; (3) The instant SAC is a bit more challenging on this front, however. That is because, on the one hand, the IIPEA and NIPEA claims in Counts VI and VII do draw in part on some of the same factual allegations relating to TSM that fuel Count V’s claim for a violation of the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act (i.e., allegations regarding how Plaintiff’s former employee Dr. Ferrick allegedly transferred numerous files containing Plaintiff’s trade secrets to Defendant’s computers), and they do allege that this misappropriation-related activity is also one of the types of economic “disrupt[ion]” or interference at issue in Counts VI and VII. (Compare D.I. [77] at paras. 196 & 198 (Count V), with id., at paras. 215-16 & 218 (Count VI), and with id. at para. 231 (Count VII)) But on the other hand, Counts VI and VII also plead that Defendant “disrupt[ed]” or interfered with Plaintiff’s economic relationships in ways that seem distinct from the TSM-related or misuse-of-confidential information-related allegations found in Count V (i.e., simply by hiring away Dr. Ferrick from Plaintiff, or by causing Dr. Ferrick to breach certain agreements with Plaintiff). (See id. at paras. 212, 217-20); (4) The cases the Court found most helpful were ones that dealt with complaints involving similar facts to what we have here—i.e., cases where a complaint pleaded a TSM claim and California law-based IIPEA or NIPEA claim, and where the IIPEA or NIPEA at least made some reference to alleged economic disruption that did not directly have to do with misappropriating trade secrets. These cases suggested that where the IIPEA or NIPEA claims were not entirely dependent on TSM-related allegations in order to try to make out the necessary case of economic disruption, then such claims should not be deemed preempted by CUTSA. See, e.g., Remedi8, LLC v. Alliance Env’t Grp., LLC, CV 23-05669 TJH (JPRx), 2024 WL 1829617, at 3, 5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2024) (finding that non-contractual claims are not preempted by CUTSA if they also have a factual basis independent of the misappropriation of a trade secret, and concluding that an IIPEA claim was not preempted where it was primarily based on the allegation that defendant had interfered with plaintiff’s relationships with its customers) (citing Angelica Textile Servs., Inc. v. Park, 220 Cal. App. 4th 495, 506 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013)); Cutera, Inc. v. Lutronic Aesthetics, Inc., No. 2:20-CV-00235-KJM-DB, 2020 WL 4937129, at 8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2020) (finding that a claim for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage was not preempted by a CUTSA claim, where the interference claim was premised on the defendant’s alleged hand in prompting several of plaintiff’s employees to leave the company and work for a competitor); Aavid Thermalloy LLC v. Cooler Master Co., Case No. 17-cv-05363-JSW, 2018 WL 11348438, at 3 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2018) (finding that an IIPEA claim was not preempted by a CUTSA claim, where while the plaintiff did allege wrongful acts in the IIPEA claim that amounted to TSM, it also alleged wrongful acts distinct from such misappropriation, and where if the TSM-related conduct were removed from the IIPEA claim, the factual allegations therein could still “support other causes of action”); see also (D.I. [99] at 13).; and (5) In line with the decisions in those cases, which the Court finds persuasive, the Court will deny this portion of the Motion here. More specifically, the Court concludes that Counts VI and VII should not be dismissed on preemption grounds because they are premised, at least in part, on alleged acts of economic disruption that do not directly sound in TSM. The Court will assess Defendant’s remaining basis for dismissal of Counts VI and VII, (D.I. [88] at 13-18), separately and in a forthcoming order. See Cutera, Inc., 2020 WL 4937129, at 8 (going on to assess whether the tortious interference claim, even if not preempted by CUTSA, was nevertheless not well-pled on other grounds). Ordered by Judge Christopher J. Burke on 02/14/2025. (smg) (Entered: 02/14/2025)
02/12/25	Agilent Technologies Inc v. Axion Biosystems Inc 1:23-CV-00198 ( D. DE )	NOTICE OF SERVICE of (1) Axion BioSystems, Inc.'s Objections and Responses to Plaintiff Agilent Technologies, Inc.'s First Set of Requests for Admission; (2) Axion BioSystems, Inc.'s Objections and Responses to Plaintiff Agilent Technologies, Inc.'s Eighth Set of Requests for Production of Documents and Things; (3) Axion BioSystems, Inc.'s First Supplemental Response to Plaintiff Agilent Technologies, Inc.'s Interrogatory Nos. 3, 5-6, 9-11, and 13-15; and (4) Axion BioSystems, Inc.'s Supplemental Responses to Plaintiff Agilent Technologies, Inc.'s Interrogatory Nos. 17, 18, and 20 filed by Axion BioSystems, Inc..(Mayo, Andrew) (Entered: 02/12/2025) NOTICE OF SERVICE of (1) Axion BioSystems, Inc.'s Objections and Responses to Plaintiff Agilent Technologies, Inc.'s First Set of Requests for Admission; (2) Axion BioSystems, Inc.'s Objections and Responses to Plaintiff Agilent Technologies, Inc.'s Eighth Set of Requests for Production of Documents and Things; (3) Axion BioSystems, Inc.'s First Supplemental Response to Plaintiff Agilent Technologies, Inc.'s Interrogatory Nos. 3, 5-6, 9-11, and 13-15; and (4) Axion BioSystems, Inc.'s Supplemental Responses to Plaintiff Agilent Technologies, Inc.'s Interrogatory Nos. 17, 18, and 20 filed by Axion BioSystems, Inc..(Mayo, Andrew) (Entered: 02/12/2025)
02/12/25	Agilent Technologies Inc v. Axion Biosystems Inc 1:23-CV-00198 ( D. DE )	NOTICE OF SERVICE of (1) Agilent Technologies, Inc.'s Second Amended Objections and Responses to Axion Biosystems, Inc.'s Interrogatory No. 5, (2) Agilent Technologies, Inc.'s Amended Objections and Responses to Axion Biosystems, Inc.'s Interrogatory No. 22, (3) Agilent Technologies, Inc.'s Fourth Amended Objections and Responses to Axion Biosystems, Inc.'s Interrogatories Nos. 17-18, and (4) Agilent Technologies, Inc.'s Fifth Amended Objections and Responses to Axion Biosystems, Inc.'s Interrogatory Nos. 13-16 - filed by Agilent Technologies, Inc..(Murray, Travis) (Entered: 02/12/2025) NOTICE OF SERVICE of (1) Agilent Technologies, Inc.'s Second Amended Objections and Responses to Axion Biosystems, Inc.'s Interrogatory No. 5, (2) Agilent Technologies, Inc.'s Amended Objections and Responses to Axion Biosystems, Inc.'s Interrogatory No. 22, (3) Agilent Technologies, Inc.'s Fourth Amended Objections and Responses to Axion Biosystems, Inc.'s Interrogatories Nos. 17-18, and (4) Agilent Technologies, Inc.'s Fifth Amended Objections and Responses to Axion Biosystems, Inc.'s Interrogatory Nos. 13-16 - filed by Agilent Technologies, Inc..(Murray, Travis) (Entered: 02/12/2025)
02/10/25	Agilent Technologies Inc v. Axion Biosystems Inc 1:23-CV-00198 ( D. DE )	ORAL ORDER: The Court has reviewed the portion of Defendant’s partial motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) (the “Motion”), (D.I. [87] ), via which Defendant has moved to dismiss Count V of the SAC (which alleges a trade secret misappropriation claim under the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act, or “DTSA”), and the briefing related thereto, (D.I. [88] ; D.I. [99] ; D.I. [101] ). Having done so, it hereby ORDERS that this portion of the Motion is GRANTED for the reasons and in the manner that follows: (1) In order to sufficiently plead trade secret misappropriation under the DTSA, a plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of a trade secret, which is defined generally as information with independent economic value that the owner has taken reasonable measures to keep secret. See Oakwood Lab’ys LLC v. Thanoo, 999 F.3d 892, 905 (3d Cir. 2021). In order to do that, a plaintiff must identify the trade secret(s) at issue “with enough specificity to place a defendant on notice of the bases for the claim being made against it[,]” and while it “need not spell out the details of the trade secret” it has to describe the trade secret “with sufficiently particularity to separate it from matters of general knowledge in the trade or special knowledge of those persons who are skilled in the trade, and to permit the defendant to ascertain at least the boundaries within which the secret lies.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).; (2) Determining whether a plaintiff in trade secret litigation has satisfied this pleading standard can be one of the more difficult calls a judge has to make in intellectual property litigation. See DeRubeis v. Witten Techs., Inc., 244 F.R.D. 676, 681 (N.D. Ga. 2007). But as a general matter, a plaintiff in such cases typically fails this test when it describes the asserted trade secrets in “broad terms[,]” such as by making high-level references to a product, system or process without explaining what more granular aspects of that product, system or process are really at issue, see Lithero, LLC v. AstraZeneca Pharms. LP, Civil Action No. 19-2320-RGA, 2020 WL 4699041, at 2 (D. Del. Aug. 13, 2020), or by lumping together broad categories of information or document types with no further specificity, see Power Integrations, Inc. v. Silanna Semiconductor N. Am., Inc., C.A. No. 19-1292-LPS, 2020 WL 3508078, at 3 (D. Del. June 29, 2020). On the other hand, when the plaintiff adds additional levels of specificity, such as by identifying not just a product name but also specific aspects of that product that are asserted to be trade secrets, see Progressive Sterilization, LLC v. Turbett Surgical LLC, Civil Action No. 19-627-CFC, 2020 WL 1849709, at 6 (D. Del. Apr. 13, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 3071951 (D. Del. June 10, 2020), or by identifying the (fairly specific) method at issue by name and then also pinpointing documents in which that particular method/trade secret is disclosed, see Illumina, Inc. v. Guardant Health, Inc., Civil Action No. 22-334-GBW-CJB, 2023 WL 1407716, at 9 (D. Del. Jan. 31, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 2867219 (D. Del. Mar. 29, 2023), it is typically on safer ground.; (3) Here, it is clear enough to the Court that Plaintiff has not met the relevant pleading bar, as its identification of the asserted trade secrets at issue are more like those in the first set of cases referenced above. In explaining why it thinks it has alleged enough on this front, Plaintiff points to its disclosure in paragraph 103 of the SAC (also mirrored in paragraph 192, found in Count V itself). (D.I. [99] at 8 (citing D.I. [77] at para. 103)) But there, Plaintiff largely points to broad categories of documents/information or overarching “strategies” (i.e., “intellectual property strategies, licensing agreements, material transfer documents and agreements...” or “documents addressing Agilent’s overall market strategy for cell analysis and gene therapy”) or those documents relating to a product line or category (i.e., “how Agilent’s... xCELLigence line of products[] operate” or “COVID-19 test development by Agilent” or certain broad-sounding categories of “documents concerning liquid biopsy diagnostics”).; (4) The Court also rejects Plaintiff’s assertion that its pleading is sufficient because it told Defendant that the trade secrets at issue are found somewhere in the 200 files (with approximately 4,000 accompanying data files) that Defendant returned to it (after Defendant learned that those files had been taken from Plaintiff by Defendant’s new hire, Plaintiff’s former employee Dr. Ferrick). (Id. at 7, 9) This amounts to telling Defendant that it should discern where a needle is located somewhere in a haystack. See Illumina, Inc., 2023 WL 1407716, at 9 (citing cases). Indeed, Plaintiff’s failure to sufficiently identify the relevant trade secrets here is more egregious than in the typical case, in that here (unlike in the typical case) Plaintiff actually has access to the particular documents taken by its former employee wherein the alleged trade secrets are said to be located. See DeRubeis, 244 F.R.D. at 680 (noting that for many trade secret plaintiffs, prior to discovery, they “have no way of knowing what trade secrets have been misappropriated”); see also (D.I. [101] at 3).; and (5) Because Plaintiff may well be able to fix these deficiencies in an amended pleading (indeed, Plaintiff, in a footnote, says that it can do better if the Court will permit it to), (D.I. [99] at 7 n.2), and in light of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)’s admonition that a court should give leave to amend “freely... when justice so requires[,]” dismissal on this ground will be WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Court will give Plaintiff instructions regarding amending its pleading once it finishes resolving the Motion. If Plaintiff does amend, it would be well advised to also be more specific regarding how the alleged trade secrets derive independent economic value from being secret—another asserted basis for dismissal here that the Court has not had to reach. (D.I. [88] at 10-11) Ordered by Judge Christopher J. Burke on 02/10/2025. (smg) (Entered: 02/10/2025) ORAL ORDER: The Court has reviewed the portion of Defendant’s partial motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) (the “Motion”), (D.I. [87] ), via which Defendant has moved to dismiss Count V of the SAC (which alleges a trade secret misappropriation claim under the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act, or “DTSA”), and the briefing related thereto, (D.I. [88] ; D.I. [99] ; D.I. [101] ). Having done so, it hereby ORDERS that this portion of the Motion is GRANTED for the reasons and in the manner that follows: (1) In order to sufficiently plead trade secret misappropriation under the DTSA, a plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of a trade secret, which is defined generally as information with independent economic value that the owner has taken reasonable measures to keep secret. See Oakwood Lab’ys LLC v. Thanoo, 999 F.3d 892, 905 (3d Cir. 2021). In order to do that, a plaintiff must identify the trade secret(s) at issue “with enough specificity to place a defendant on notice of the bases for the claim being made against it[,]” and while it “need not spell out the details of the trade secret” it has to describe the trade secret “with sufficiently particularity to separate it from matters of general knowledge in the trade or special knowledge of those persons who are skilled in the trade, and to permit the defendant to ascertain at least the boundaries within which the secret lies.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).; (2) Determining whether a plaintiff in trade secret litigation has satisfied this pleading standard can be one of the more difficult calls a judge has to make in intellectual property litigation. See DeRubeis v. Witten Techs., Inc., 244 F.R.D. 676, 681 (N.D. Ga. 2007). But as a general matter, a plaintiff in such cases typically fails this test when it describes the asserted trade secrets in “broad terms[,]” such as by making high-level references to a product, system or process without explaining what more granular aspects of that product, system or process are really at issue, see Lithero, LLC v. AstraZeneca Pharms. LP, Civil Action No. 19-2320-RGA, 2020 WL 4699041, at 2 (D. Del. Aug. 13, 2020), or by lumping together broad categories of information or document types with no further specificity, see Power Integrations, Inc. v. Silanna Semiconductor N. Am., Inc., C.A. No. 19-1292-LPS, 2020 WL 3508078, at 3 (D. Del. June 29, 2020). On the other hand, when the plaintiff adds additional levels of specificity, such as by identifying not just a product name but also specific aspects of that product that are asserted to be trade secrets, see Progressive Sterilization, LLC v. Turbett Surgical LLC, Civil Action No. 19-627-CFC, 2020 WL 1849709, at 6 (D. Del. Apr. 13, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 3071951 (D. Del. June 10, 2020), or by identifying the (fairly specific) method at issue by name and then also pinpointing documents in which that particular method/trade secret is disclosed, see Illumina, Inc. v. Guardant Health, Inc., Civil Action No. 22-334-GBW-CJB, 2023 WL 1407716, at 9 (D. Del. Jan. 31, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 2867219 (D. Del. Mar. 29, 2023), it is typically on safer ground.; (3) Here, it is clear enough to the Court that Plaintiff has not met the relevant pleading bar, as its identification of the asserted trade secrets at issue are more like those in the first set of cases referenced above. In explaining why it thinks it has alleged enough on this front, Plaintiff points to its disclosure in paragraph 103 of the SAC (also mirrored in paragraph 192, found in Count V itself). (D.I. [99] at 8 (citing D.I. [77] at para. 103)) But there, Plaintiff largely points to broad categories of documents/information or overarching “strategies” (i.e., “intellectual property strategies, licensing agreements, material transfer documents and agreements...” or “documents addressing Agilent’s overall market strategy for cell analysis and gene therapy”) or those documents relating to a product line or category (i.e., “how Agilent’s... xCELLigence line of products[] operate” or “COVID-19 test development by Agilent” or certain broad-sounding categories of “documents concerning liquid biopsy diagnostics”).; (4) The Court also rejects Plaintiff’s assertion that its pleading is sufficient because it told Defendant that the trade secrets at issue are found somewhere in the 200 files (with approximately 4,000 accompanying data files) that Defendant returned to it (after Defendant learned that those files had been taken from Plaintiff by Defendant’s new hire, Plaintiff’s former employee Dr. Ferrick). (Id. at 7, 9) This amounts to telling Defendant that it should discern where a needle is located somewhere in a haystack. See Illumina, Inc., 2023 WL 1407716, at 9 (citing cases). Indeed, Plaintiff’s failure to sufficiently identify the relevant trade secrets here is more egregious than in the typical case, in that here (unlike in the typical case) Plaintiff actually has access to the particular documents taken by its former employee wherein the alleged trade secrets are said to be located. See DeRubeis, 244 F.R.D. at 680 (noting that for many trade secret plaintiffs, prior to discovery, they “have no way of knowing what trade secrets have been misappropriated”); see also (D.I. [101] at 3).; and (5) Because Plaintiff may well be able to fix these deficiencies in an amended pleading (indeed, Plaintiff, in a footnote, says that it can do better if the Court will permit it to), (D.I. [99] at 7 n.2), and in light of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)’s admonition that a court should give leave to amend “freely... when justice so requires[,]” dismissal on this ground will be WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Court will give Plaintiff instructions regarding amending its pleading once it finishes resolving the Motion. If Plaintiff does amend, it would be well advised to also be more specific regarding how the alleged trade secrets derive independent economic value from being secret—another asserted basis for dismissal here that the Court has not had to reach. (D.I. [88] at 10-11) Ordered by Judge Christopher J. Burke on 02/10/2025. (smg) (Entered: 02/10/2025)
02/10/25	Agilent Technologies Inc v. Axion Biosystems Inc 1:23-CV-00198 ( D. DE )	NOTICE to Take Deposition of Deborah Hurtado on February 12, 2025 (Amended) filed by Agilent Technologies, Inc..(Murray, Travis) (Entered: 02/10/2025)
02/06/25	Agilent Technologies Inc v. Axion Biosystems Inc 1:23-CV-00198 ( D. DE )	NOTICE OF SERVICE of Axion Biosystems, Inc's Objections and Responses to Plaintiff Agilent Technologies, Inc.'s Seventh Set of Requests for Production of Documents and Things filed by Axion BioSystems, Inc..(Mayo, Andrew) (Entered: 02/06/2025)
02/06/25	Agilent Technologies Inc v. Axion Biosystems Inc 1:23-CV-00198 ( D. DE )	NOTICE OF SERVICE of Agilent Technologies, Inc.'s Corrected Third Amended Objections and Responses to Axion Biosystems, Inc.'s Interrogatory No. 1 - filed by Agilent Technologies, Inc..(Murray, Travis) (Entered: 02/06/2025)
02/05/25	Agilent Technologies Inc v. Axion Biosystems Inc 1:23-CV-00198 ( D. DE )	NOTICE OF SERVICE of (1) Agilent Technologies, Inc.'s Corrected Third Amended Objections and Response to Axion Biosystems, Inc.'s Interrogatory No. 11; and (2) Agilent Technologies, Inc.'s Corrected Second Amended Objections and Responses to Axion Biosystems, Inc.'s Interrogatories No. 6 filed by Agilent Technologies, Inc..(Murray, Travis) (Entered: 02/05/2025)
02/05/25	Agilent Technologies Inc v. Axion Biosystems Inc 1:23-CV-00198 ( D. DE )	NOTICE OF SERVICE of (1) Plaintiff Agilent Technologies, Inc.'s Second Amended and Supplemental Initial Disclosures and (2) Agilent Technologies, Inc.'s Third Amended Objections and Responses to Axion Biosystems, Inc.'s Interrogatory No. 1 filed by Agilent Technologies, Inc..(Murray, Travis) (Entered: 02/05/2025)