JD E Commerce America Ltd

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Entered	Case	Description
08/13/24	Domesick v. JD E Commerce America Ltd 3:23-CV-00590 ( D. CT )	ORDER. Plaintiff has moved for default judgment against Defendants Centune Toon Inc., Htpoil Holding Trade Co., Ltd., Inno Products Mall Inc., and Li Ma ("Defendants"). ECF No. 90. This motion is DENIED without prejudice because Plaintiff has not established that the Court has personal jurisdiction over these defendants. Before a district court grants a motion for default judgment, it should "assure itself that it has personal jurisdiction over the defendant." Sinoying Logistics Pte Ltd. v. Yi Da Xin Trading Corp., 619 F.3d 207, 213 (2d Cir. 2010). "There are two types of personal jurisdiction: specific and general." Sonera Holding B.V. v. ukurova Holding A.., 750 F.3d 221, 225 (2d Cir. 2014). General jurisdiction is not at issue here because Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants' "contacts with [Connecticut] are so continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at home in the forum State." Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Specific jurisdiction is asserted "[w]here [the] claim arises out of, or relates to, [an out-of-state] defendant's contacts with the forum." Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 732 F.3d 161, 170 (2d Cir. 2013). In such cases, there must be "a connection between the forum exercising jurisdiction over the defendant and the underlying controversy that gave rise to the claim." Alcon Lab'ys, Inc. v. Allied Vision Grp., Inc., No. 18-CV-02486, 2018 WL 10550777, at 4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2018). Connecticut's long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution must both be satisfied. See Bensmiller v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 47 F.3d 79, 81 (2nd Cir. 1995). Due process requires that the defendant "have certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Int'l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Off. of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted). There are two methods by which an out-of-state defendant may establish minimum contacts with the forum state: "(1) 'purposeful availment,' in which the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in the forum state and could foresee being haled into court there; and (2) 'purposeful direction,' also known as the 'effects test,' which establishes personal jurisdiction when the conduct that forms the basis for the controversy occurs entirely out-of-forum, and the only relevant jurisdictional contacts with the forum are therefore in-forum effects harmful to the plaintiff. The 'effects test' generally requires that plaintiffs show that the defendants' conduct was intentional and expressly aimed at the forum state with the knowledge that substantial injury would be felt there." In re SSA Bonds Antitrust Litig., 420 F. Supp. 3d 219, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, Defendants are all out-of-state residents. ECF No. 70 at 2-3. Plaintiff contends that they are subject to the Court's jurisdiction because they "have established sufficient minimum contacts with Connecticut" through their use of Walmarts online platform and because they "knowingly and intentionally engaged in actions that target this District, including the distribution of infringing planking devices." ECF No. 91 at 6. An out-of-state defendant's online activity can give rise to personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Ayla, LLC v. Alya Skin Pty. Ltd., 11 F.4th 972, 980 (9th Cir. 2021) (finding personal jurisdiction over an international defendant who "targeted its promotional materials specifically towards the United States"); Alcon Lab'ys, Inc., 2018 WL 10550777, at 10 ("Defendants have purposefully availed themselves of the New York forum by shipping products [from online sales] to New York, advertising and selling products through an interactive website accessible from New York, and circulating advertisements in New York periodicals published by New York-based publishers."). But Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts for the Court to find that Defendants established minimum contacts with Connecticut. Though he notes that the Walmart platform "offers location-specific features targeting Connecticut residents [and] allows its vendors to make use of [Walmart's] substantial physical presence in the state for functions like in-store returns," he does not explain how, exactly, the particular defendants against whom he seeks a default judgment made use of these features in a way that shows they satisfy Connecticut's long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause. ECF No. 91 at 6. He may renew his motion for default judgment by providing any additional evidence he has regarding these defendants' contact with Connecticut and an explanation of how such evidence demonstrates that the Court has personal jurisdiction over the defendants that are the subject of his motion. Any renewed motion, together with any accompanying evidence, must be filed by September 13, 2024. Signed by Judge Michael P. Shea on 8/13/2024. (Bender, Sarah) (Entered: 08/13/2024) ORDER. Plaintiff has moved for default judgment against Defendants Centune Toon Inc., Htpoil Holding Trade Co., Ltd., Inno Products Mall Inc., and Li Ma ("Defendants"). ECF No. 90. This motion is DENIED without prejudice because Plaintiff has not established that the Court has personal jurisdiction over these defendants. Before a district court grants a motion for default judgment, it should "assure itself that it has personal jurisdiction over the defendant." Sinoying Logistics Pte Ltd. v. Yi Da Xin Trading Corp., 619 F.3d 207, 213 (2d Cir. 2010). "There are two types of personal jurisdiction: specific and general." Sonera Holding B.V. v. ukurova Holding A.., 750 F.3d 221, 225 (2d Cir. 2014). General jurisdiction is not at issue here because Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants' "contacts with [Connecticut] are so continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at home in the forum State." Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Specific jurisdiction is asserted "[w]here [the] claim arises out of, or relates to, [an out-of-state] defendant's contacts with the forum." Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 732 F.3d 161, 170 (2d Cir. 2013). In such cases, there must be "a connection between the forum exercising jurisdiction over the defendant and the underlying controversy that gave rise to the claim." Alcon Lab'ys, Inc. v. Allied Vision Grp., Inc., No. 18-CV-02486, 2018 WL 10550777, at 4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2018). Connecticut's long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution must both be satisfied. See Bensmiller v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 47 F.3d 79, 81 (2nd Cir. 1995). Due process requires that the defendant "have certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Int'l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Off. of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted). There are two methods by which an out-of-state defendant may establish minimum contacts with the forum state: "(1) 'purposeful availment,' in which the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in the forum state and could foresee being haled into court there; and (2) 'purposeful direction,' also known as the 'effects test,' which establishes personal jurisdiction when the conduct that forms the basis for the controversy occurs entirely out-of-forum, and the only relevant jurisdictional contacts with the forum are therefore in-forum effects harmful to the plaintiff. The 'effects test' generally requires that plaintiffs show that the defendants' conduct was intentional and expressly aimed at the forum state with the knowledge that substantial injury would be felt there." In re SSA Bonds Antitrust Litig., 420 F. Supp. 3d 219, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, Defendants are all out-of-state residents. ECF No. 70 at 2-3. Plaintiff contends that they are subject to the Court's jurisdiction because they "have established sufficient minimum contacts with Connecticut" through their use of Walmarts online platform and because they "knowingly and intentionally engaged in actions that target this District, including the distribution of infringing planking devices." ECF No. 91 at 6. An out-of-state defendant's online activity can give rise to personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Ayla, LLC v. Alya Skin Pty. Ltd., 11 F.4th 972, 980 (9th Cir. 2021) (finding personal jurisdiction over an international defendant who "targeted its promotional materials specifically towards the United States"); Alcon Lab'ys, Inc., 2018 WL 10550777, at 10 ("Defendants have purposefully availed themselves of the New York forum by shipping products [from online sales] to New York, advertising and selling products through an interactive website accessible from New York, and circulating advertisements in New York periodicals published by New York-based publishers."). But Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts for the Court to find that Defendants established minimum contacts with Connecticut. Though he notes that the Walmart platform "offers location-specific features targeting Connecticut residents [and] allows its vendors to make use of [Walmart's] substantial physical presence in the state for functions like in-store returns," he does not explain how, exactly, the particular defendants against whom he seeks a default judgment made use of these features in a way that shows they satisfy Connecticut's long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause. ECF No. 91 at 6. He may renew his motion for default judgment by providing any additional evidence he has regarding these defendants' contact with Connecticut and an explanation of how such evidence demonstrates that the Court has personal jurisdiction over the defendants that are the subject of his motion. Any renewed motion, together with any accompanying evidence, must be filed by September 13, 2024. Signed by Judge Michael P. Shea on 8/13/2024. (Bender, Sarah) (Entered: 08/13/2024)
08/13/24	Domesick v. JD E Commerce America Ltd 3:23-CV-00590 ( D. CT )	ORDER. Plaintiff has moved for default judgment against Defendants Centune Toon Inc., Htpoil Holding Trade Co., Ltd., Inno Products Mall Inc., and Li Ma ("Defendants"). ECF No. 90. This motion is DENIED without prejudice because Plaintiff has not established that the Court has personal jurisdiction over these defendants. Before a district court grants a motion for default judgment, it should "assure itself that it has personal jurisdiction over the defendant." Sinoying Logistics Pte Ltd. v. Yi Da Xin Trading Corp., 619 F.3d 207, 213 (2d Cir. 2010). "There are two types of personal jurisdiction: specific and general." Sonera Holding B.V. v. ukurova Holding A.., 750 F.3d 221, 225 (2d Cir. 2014). General jurisdiction is not at issue here because Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants' "contacts with [Connecticut] are so continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at home in the forum State." Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Specific jurisdiction is asserted "[w]here [the] claim arises out of, or relates to, [an out-of-state] defendant's contacts with the forum." Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 732 F.3d 161, 170 (2d Cir. 2013). In such cases, there must be "a connection between the forum exercising jurisdiction over the defendant and the underlying controversy that gave rise to the claim." Alcon Lab'ys, Inc. v. Allied Vision Grp., Inc., No. 18-CV-02486, 2018 WL 10550777, at 4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2018). Connecticut's long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution must both be satisfied. See Bensmiller v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 47 F.3d 79, 81 (2nd Cir. 1995). Due process requires that the defendant "have certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Int'l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Off. of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted). There are two methods by which an out-of-state defendant may establish minimum contacts with the forum state: "(1) 'purposeful availment,' in which the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in the forum state and could foresee being haled into court there; and (2) 'purposeful direction,' also known as the 'effects test,' which establishes personal jurisdiction when the conduct that forms the basis for the controversy occurs entirely out-of-forum, and the only relevant jurisdictional contacts with the forum are therefore in-forum effects harmful to the plaintiff. The 'effects test' generally requires that plaintiffs show that the defendants' conduct was intentional and expressly aimed at the forum state with the knowledge that substantial injury would be felt there." In re SSA Bonds Antitrust Litig., 420 F. Supp. 3d 219, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, Defendants are all out-of-state residents. ECF No. 70 at 2-3. Plaintiff contends that they are subject to the Court's jurisdiction because they "have established sufficient minimum contacts with Connecticut" through their use of Walmarts online platform and because they "knowingly and intentionally engaged in actions that target this District, including the distribution of infringing planking devices." ECF No. 91 at 6. An out-of-state defendant's online activity can give rise to personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Ayla, LLC v. Alya Skin Pty. Ltd., 11 F.4th 972, 980 (9th Cir. 2021) (finding personal jurisdiction over an international defendant who "targeted its promotional materials specifically towards the United States"); Alcon Lab'ys, Inc., 2018 WL 10550777, at 10 ("Defendants have purposefully availed themselves of the New York forum by shipping products [from online sales] to New York, advertising and selling products through an interactive website accessible from New York, and circulating advertisements in New York periodicals published by New York-based publishers."). But Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts for the Court to find that Defendants established minimum contacts with Connecticut. Though he notes that the Walmart platform "offers location-specific features targeting Connecticut residents [and] allows its vendors to make use of [Walmart's] substantial physical presence in the state for functions like in-store returns," he does not explain how, exactly, the particular defendants against whom he seeks a default judgment made use of these features in a way that shows they satisfy Connecticut's long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause. ECF No. 91 at 6. He may renew his motion for default judgment by providing any additional evidence he has regarding these defendants' contact with Connecticut and an explanation of how such evidence demonstrates that the Court has personal jurisdiction over the defendants that are the subject of his motion. Any renewed motion, together with any accompanying evidence, must be filed by September 13, 2024. Signed by Judge Michael P. Shea on 8/13/2024. (Bender, Sarah) (Entered: 08/13/2024) ORDER. Plaintiff has moved for default judgment against Defendants Centune Toon Inc., Htpoil Holding Trade Co., Ltd., Inno Products Mall Inc., and Li Ma ("Defendants"). ECF No. 90. This motion is DENIED without prejudice because Plaintiff has not established that the Court has personal jurisdiction over these defendants. Before a district court grants a motion for default judgment, it should "assure itself that it has personal jurisdiction over the defendant." Sinoying Logistics Pte Ltd. v. Yi Da Xin Trading Corp., 619 F.3d 207, 213 (2d Cir. 2010). "There are two types of personal jurisdiction: specific and general." Sonera Holding B.V. v. ukurova Holding A.., 750 F.3d 221, 225 (2d Cir. 2014). General jurisdiction is not at issue here because Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants' "contacts with [Connecticut] are so continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at home in the forum State." Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Specific jurisdiction is asserted "[w]here [the] claim arises out of, or relates to, [an out-of-state] defendant's contacts with the forum." Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 732 F.3d 161, 170 (2d Cir. 2013). In such cases, there must be "a connection between the forum exercising jurisdiction over the defendant and the underlying controversy that gave rise to the claim." Alcon Lab'ys, Inc. v. Allied Vision Grp., Inc., No. 18-CV-02486, 2018 WL 10550777, at 4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2018). Connecticut's long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution must both be satisfied. See Bensmiller v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 47 F.3d 79, 81 (2nd Cir. 1995). Due process requires that the defendant "have certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Int'l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Off. of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted). There are two methods by which an out-of-state defendant may establish minimum contacts with the forum state: "(1) 'purposeful availment,' in which the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in the forum state and could foresee being haled into court there; and (2) 'purposeful direction,' also known as the 'effects test,' which establishes personal jurisdiction when the conduct that forms the basis for the controversy occurs entirely out-of-forum, and the only relevant jurisdictional contacts with the forum are therefore in-forum effects harmful to the plaintiff. The 'effects test' generally requires that plaintiffs show that the defendants' conduct was intentional and expressly aimed at the forum state with the knowledge that substantial injury would be felt there." In re SSA Bonds Antitrust Litig., 420 F. Supp. 3d 219, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, Defendants are all out-of-state residents. ECF No. 70 at 2-3. Plaintiff contends that they are subject to the Court's jurisdiction because they "have established sufficient minimum contacts with Connecticut" through their use of Walmarts online platform and because they "knowingly and intentionally engaged in actions that target this District, including the distribution of infringing planking devices." ECF No. 91 at 6. An out-of-state defendant's online activity can give rise to personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Ayla, LLC v. Alya Skin Pty. Ltd., 11 F.4th 972, 980 (9th Cir. 2021) (finding personal jurisdiction over an international defendant who "targeted its promotional materials specifically towards the United States"); Alcon Lab'ys, Inc., 2018 WL 10550777, at 10 ("Defendants have purposefully availed themselves of the New York forum by shipping products [from online sales] to New York, advertising and selling products through an interactive website accessible from New York, and circulating advertisements in New York periodicals published by New York-based publishers."). But Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts for the Court to find that Defendants established minimum contacts with Connecticut. Though he notes that the Walmart platform "offers location-specific features targeting Connecticut residents [and] allows its vendors to make use of [Walmart's] substantial physical presence in the state for functions like in-store returns," he does not explain how, exactly, the particular defendants against whom he seeks a default judgment made use of these features in a way that shows they satisfy Connecticut's long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause. ECF No. 91 at 6. He may renew his motion for default judgment by providing any additional evidence he has regarding these defendants' contact with Connecticut and an explanation of how such evidence demonstrates that the Court has personal jurisdiction over the defendants that are the subject of his motion. Any renewed motion, together with any accompanying evidence, must be filed by September 13, 2024. Signed by Judge Michael P. Shea on 8/13/2024. (Bender, Sarah) (Entered: 08/13/2024)
05/15/24	Domesick v. JD E Commerce America Ltd 3:23-CV-00590 ( D. CT )	ORDER. Plaintiff has filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal as to Defendant Jaybally, Inc. As such, the Court DISMISSES this Defendant. The Clerks is instructed to terminate Defendant Jaybally, Inc as a Defendant. Signed by Judge Michael P Shea on 5/15/2024. (Bassali, D) (Entered: 05/15/2024)
05/15/24	Domesick v. JD E Commerce America Ltd 3:23-CV-00590 ( D. CT )	ORDER. Plaintiff has filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal as to Defendant Jaybally, Inc. As such, the Court DISMISSES this Defendant. The Clerks is instructed to terminate Defendant Jaybally, Inc as a Defendant. Signed by Judge Michael P Shea on 5/15/2024. (Bassali, D) (Entered: 05/15/2024)
04/19/24	Domesick v. JD E Commerce America Ltd 3:23-CV-00590 ( D. CT )	NOTICE of Voluntary Dismissal of Jaybally, Inc. by Michael Domesick (Domesick, Michael) (Entered: 04/19/2024)
12/21/23	Domesick v. JD E Commerce America Ltd 3:23-CV-00590 ( D. CT )	ORDER. The 101 motion to dismiss Defendant Wenchang Liuzuohu Shangmao Youxiangongsi is GRANTED. Defendant Wenchang Liuzuohu Shangmao Youxiangongsi is dismissed without prejudice. Signed by Judge Michael P Shea on 12/21/2023. (Bassali, David) (Entered: 12/21/2023)
12/18/23	Domesick v. JD E Commerce America Ltd 3:23-CV-00590 ( D. CT )	MOTION to Dismiss Defendant Wenchang Liuzuohu Shangmao Youxiangongsi (A.K.A. Street Corner Co., LTD) by Michael Domesick.Responses due by 1/8/2024 (Domesick, Michael) (Entered: 12/18/2023)
11/30/23	Domesick v. JD E Commerce America Ltd 3:23-CV-00590 ( D. CT )	ORDER. Plaintiff has moved for an order authorizing alternative methods of service on Defendant Wenchang Liuzuohu Shangmao Youxiangongsi ("Wenchang"). ECF No. 89. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks to serve Wenchang, a Chinese business entity, via email. Rule 4(f)(3) allows litigants in the United States to serve an individual or entity outside of the United States "by other means not prohibited by international agreement." Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3). While "[t]he decision whether to allow alternative methods of serving process under Rule 4(f)(3) is committed to the sound discretion of the district court," Madu, Edozie & Madu, P.C. v. SocketWorks Ltd. Nigeria, 265 F.R.D. 106, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted), courts are not permitted to authorize a method of service that would violate an international agreement. Here, service via email on a Chinese entity would violate the Hague Convention. See Smart Study Co. v. Acuteye-Us, 620 F. Supp. 3d 1382, 139297 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (holding that "service via email on litigants located in China is not permitted by the Hague Convention" because China has objected to service "by postal channels," which, the Court reasoned, includes email). Because email service would violate the Hague Convention, service via email is not permissible under Rule 4(f)(3). Service via email would still be inappropriate even if the Hague Convention did not apply here. "The Hague Convention does not apply 'where the address of the person to be served with the document is not known.'" Advanced Access Content Sys. Licensing Adm'r, LLC v. Shen, No. 14-CV-1112, 2018 WL 4757939, at 4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2018) (citing Hague Convention art. 1). "Courts in this Circuit have found that an address is not known if the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to discover a physical address for service of process and was unsuccessful in doing so." Id. (collecting cases). Here, Plaintiff represents that he tried to mail the summons, complaint, and waiver of service forms to Wenchang at the address listed on the Walmart.com marketplace website, but the package was returned undelivered with a sticker indicating that the address was "unknown." ECF No. 89-1 at 2. Plaintiff also avers that Walmart.com gave him only that address for the defendant and that his attempts to find Wenchang on the internet "offer no corroborative information to verify that its actual physical address aligns with what is listed on its Walmart.com seller profile." Id. While Plaintiffs efforts arguably satisfy the "reasonable diligence" requirement, email service is still inappropriate because it is prohibited by Chinese law. If the Hague Convention does not apply, Rule 4(f)(2) would govern service here. Rule 4(f)(2) provides that a foreign individual or entity may be served as follows:"(2) if there is no internationally agreed means, or if an international agreement allows but does not specify other means, by a method that is reasonably calculated to give notice:(A) as prescribed by the foreign country's law for service in that country in an action in its courts of general jurisdiction;(B) as the foreign authority directs in response to a letter rogatory or letter of request; or(C) unless prohibited by the foreign country's law, by:(i) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally; or(ii) using any form of mail that the clerk addresses and sends to the individual and that requires a signed receipt"Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(2). None of these provisions permits email service here. Rule 4(f)(2)(A) does not apply because "in China, the courts themselves serve documents on litigants." See Smart Study Co., 620 F. Supp. 3d at 1398 ("To serve a party in China, an individual in a foreign country must apply to the Ministry of Justice. If the Ministry of Justice approves that request, the Ministry of Justice will forward the material to the Supreme People's Court of China, which will review the request and distribute it to a local court. The local court then arranges the service and sends proof of service back to the Ministry of Justice, which forwards that proof along to the serving party." (internal citations omitted)). Email service is not the method "prescribed by the foreign country's law for service in that country," and so Rule 4(f)(2)(A) is inapplicable. Rule 4(f)(2)(B) is also inapplicable because there is no indication that the foreign authority here has directed the use of email service "in response to a letter rogatory or letter of request." Finally, email service would not be proper under Rule 4(f)(2)(C) because, as mentioned above, email service is not permitted by Chinese law. See id. at 1399 ("Rule 4(f)(2)(C) only permits service via methods that are not 'prohibited by the foreign country's law.' Here, the law of the People's Republic of China prohibits foreign entities and individuals from serving litigants in China without the consent of the Ministry of Justice. And there is no dispute that Plaintiff did not apply to the Ministry of Justice to serve the defendants in this case. Accordingly, Plaintiff failed to serve the defendants via Rule 4(f)(2)(C)."). Thus, even if the Hague Convention did not apply here, this Court would not be empowered to permit email service on Wenchang.Thus, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion for an order authorizing service via email. The stay on Plaintiff's deadline to serve Wenchang is lifted, and Plaintiff must serve Wenchang in a manner permitted by Rule 4 by December 22, 2023. Signed by Judge Michael P Shea on 11/30/2023. (Bassali, David) (Entered: 11/30/2023) ORDER. Plaintiff has moved for an order authorizing alternative methods of service on Defendant Wenchang Liuzuohu Shangmao Youxiangongsi ("Wenchang"). ECF No. 89. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks to serve Wenchang, a Chinese business entity, via email. Rule 4(f)(3) allows litigants in the United States to serve an individual or entity outside of the United States "by other means not prohibited by international agreement." Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3). While "[t]he decision whether to allow alternative methods of serving process under Rule 4(f)(3) is committed to the sound discretion of the district court," Madu, Edozie & Madu, P.C. v. SocketWorks Ltd. Nigeria, 265 F.R.D. 106, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted), courts are not permitted to authorize a method of service that would violate an international agreement. Here, service via email on a Chinese entity would violate the Hague Convention. See Smart Study Co. v. Acuteye-Us, 620 F. Supp. 3d 1382, 139297 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (holding that "service via email on litigants located in China is not permitted by the Hague Convention" because China has objected to service "by postal channels," which, the Court reasoned, includes email). Because email service would violate the Hague Convention, service via email is not permissible under Rule 4(f)(3). Service via email would still be inappropriate even if the Hague Convention did not apply here. "The Hague Convention does not apply 'where the address of the person to be served with the document is not known.'" Advanced Access Content Sys. Licensing Adm'r, LLC v. Shen, No. 14-CV-1112, 2018 WL 4757939, at 4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2018) (citing Hague Convention art. 1). "Courts in this Circuit have found that an address is not known if the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to discover a physical address for service of process and was unsuccessful in doing so." Id. (collecting cases). Here, Plaintiff represents that he tried to mail the summons, complaint, and waiver of service forms to Wenchang at the address listed on the Walmart.com marketplace website, but the package was returned undelivered with a sticker indicating that the address was "unknown." ECF No. 89-1 at 2. Plaintiff also avers that Walmart.com gave him only that address for the defendant and that his attempts to find Wenchang on the internet "offer no corroborative information to verify that its actual physical address aligns with what is listed on its Walmart.com seller profile." Id. While Plaintiffs efforts arguably satisfy the "reasonable diligence" requirement, email service is still inappropriate because it is prohibited by Chinese law. If the Hague Convention does not apply, Rule 4(f)(2) would govern service here. Rule 4(f)(2) provides that a foreign individual or entity may be served as follows:"(2) if there is no internationally agreed means, or if an international agreement allows but does not specify other means, by a method that is reasonably calculated to give notice:(A) as prescribed by the foreign country's law for service in that country in an action in its courts of general jurisdiction;(B) as the foreign authority directs in response to a letter rogatory or letter of request; or(C) unless prohibited by the foreign country's law, by:(i) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally; or(ii) using any form of mail that the clerk addresses and sends to the individual and that requires a signed receipt"Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(2). None of these provisions permits email service here. Rule 4(f)(2)(A) does not apply because "in China, the courts themselves serve documents on litigants." See Smart Study Co., 620 F. Supp. 3d at 1398 ("To serve a party in China, an individual in a foreign country must apply to the Ministry of Justice. If the Ministry of Justice approves that request, the Ministry of Justice will forward the material to the Supreme People's Court of China, which will review the request and distribute it to a local court. The local court then arranges the service and sends proof of service back to the Ministry of Justice, which forwards that proof along to the serving party." (internal citations omitted)). Email service is not the method "prescribed by the foreign country's law for service in that country," and so Rule 4(f)(2)(A) is inapplicable. Rule 4(f)(2)(B) is also inapplicable because there is no indication that the foreign authority here has directed the use of email service "in response to a letter rogatory or letter of request." Finally, email service would not be proper under Rule 4(f)(2)(C) because, as mentioned above, email service is not permitted by Chinese law. See id. at 1399 ("Rule 4(f)(2)(C) only permits service via methods that are not 'prohibited by the foreign country's law.' Here, the law of the People's Republic of China prohibits foreign entities and individuals from serving litigants in China without the consent of the Ministry of Justice. And there is no dispute that Plaintiff did not apply to the Ministry of Justice to serve the defendants in this case. Accordingly, Plaintiff failed to serve the defendants via Rule 4(f)(2)(C)."). Thus, even if the Hague Convention did not apply here, this Court would not be empowered to permit email service on Wenchang.Thus, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion for an order authorizing service via email. The stay on Plaintiff's deadline to serve Wenchang is lifted, and Plaintiff must serve Wenchang in a manner permitted by Rule 4 by December 22, 2023. Signed by Judge Michael P Shea on 11/30/2023. (Bassali, David) (Entered: 11/30/2023)
11/30/23	Domesick v. JD E Commerce America Ltd 3:23-CV-00590 ( D. CT )	ORDER. Plaintiff has moved for an order authorizing alternative methods of service on Defendant Wenchang Liuzuohu Shangmao Youxiangongsi ("Wenchang"). ECF No. 89. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks to serve Wenchang, a Chinese business entity, via email. Rule 4(f)(3) allows litigants in the United States to serve an individual or entity outside of the United States "by other means not prohibited by international agreement." Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3). While "[t]he decision whether to allow alternative methods of serving process under Rule 4(f)(3) is committed to the sound discretion of the district court," Madu, Edozie & Madu, P.C. v. SocketWorks Ltd. Nigeria, 265 F.R.D. 106, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted), courts are not permitted to authorize a method of service that would violate an international agreement. Here, service via email on a Chinese entity would violate the Hague Convention. See Smart Study Co. v. Acuteye-Us, 620 F. Supp. 3d 1382, 139297 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (holding that "service via email on litigants located in China is not permitted by the Hague Convention" because China has objected to service "by postal channels," which, the Court reasoned, includes email). Because email service would violate the Hague Convention, service via email is not permissible under Rule 4(f)(3). Service via email would still be inappropriate even if the Hague Convention did not apply here. "The Hague Convention does not apply 'where the address of the person to be served with the document is not known.'" Advanced Access Content Sys. Licensing Adm'r, LLC v. Shen, No. 14-CV-1112, 2018 WL 4757939, at 4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2018) (citing Hague Convention art. 1). "Courts in this Circuit have found that an address is not known if the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to discover a physical address for service of process and was unsuccessful in doing so." Id. (collecting cases). Here, Plaintiff represents that he tried to mail the summons, complaint, and waiver of service forms to Wenchang at the address listed on the Walmart.com marketplace website, but the package was returned undelivered with a sticker indicating that the address was "unknown." ECF No. 89-1 at 2. Plaintiff also avers that Walmart.com gave him only that address for the defendant and that his attempts to find Wenchang on the internet "offer no corroborative information to verify that its actual physical address aligns with what is listed on its Walmart.com seller profile." Id. While Plaintiffs efforts arguably satisfy the "reasonable diligence" requirement, email service is still inappropriate because it is prohibited by Chinese law. If the Hague Convention does not apply, Rule 4(f)(2) would govern service here. Rule 4(f)(2) provides that a foreign individual or entity may be served as follows:"(2) if there is no internationally agreed means, or if an international agreement allows but does not specify other means, by a method that is reasonably calculated to give notice:(A) as prescribed by the foreign country's law for service in that country in an action in its courts of general jurisdiction;(B) as the foreign authority directs in response to a letter rogatory or letter of request; or(C) unless prohibited by the foreign country's law, by:(i) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally; or(ii) using any form of mail that the clerk addresses and sends to the individual and that requires a signed receipt"Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(2). None of these provisions permits email service here. Rule 4(f)(2)(A) does not apply because "in China, the courts themselves serve documents on litigants." See Smart Study Co., 620 F. Supp. 3d at 1398 ("To serve a party in China, an individual in a foreign country must apply to the Ministry of Justice. If the Ministry of Justice approves that request, the Ministry of Justice will forward the material to the Supreme People's Court of China, which will review the request and distribute it to a local court. The local court then arranges the service and sends proof of service back to the Ministry of Justice, which forwards that proof along to the serving party." (internal citations omitted)). Email service is not the method "prescribed by the foreign country's law for service in that country," and so Rule 4(f)(2)(A) is inapplicable. Rule 4(f)(2)(B) is also inapplicable because there is no indication that the foreign authority here has directed the use of email service "in response to a letter rogatory or letter of request." Finally, email service would not be proper under Rule 4(f)(2)(C) because, as mentioned above, email service is not permitted by Chinese law. See id. at 1399 ("Rule 4(f)(2)(C) only permits service via methods that are not 'prohibited by the foreign country's law.' Here, the law of the People's Republic of China prohibits foreign entities and individuals from serving litigants in China without the consent of the Ministry of Justice. And there is no dispute that Plaintiff did not apply to the Ministry of Justice to serve the defendants in this case. Accordingly, Plaintiff failed to serve the defendants via Rule 4(f)(2)(C)."). Thus, even if the Hague Convention did not apply here, this Court would not be empowered to permit email service on Wenchang.Thus, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion for an order authorizing service via email. The stay on Plaintiff's deadline to serve Wenchang is lifted, and Plaintiff must serve Wenchang in a manner permitted by Rule 4 by December 22, 2023. Signed by Judge Michael P Shea on 11/30/2023. (Bassali, David) (Entered: 11/30/2023) ORDER. Plaintiff has moved for an order authorizing alternative methods of service on Defendant Wenchang Liuzuohu Shangmao Youxiangongsi ("Wenchang"). ECF No. 89. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks to serve Wenchang, a Chinese business entity, via email. Rule 4(f)(3) allows litigants in the United States to serve an individual or entity outside of the United States "by other means not prohibited by international agreement." Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3). While "[t]he decision whether to allow alternative methods of serving process under Rule 4(f)(3) is committed to the sound discretion of the district court," Madu, Edozie & Madu, P.C. v. SocketWorks Ltd. Nigeria, 265 F.R.D. 106, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted), courts are not permitted to authorize a method of service that would violate an international agreement. Here, service via email on a Chinese entity would violate the Hague Convention. See Smart Study Co. v. Acuteye-Us, 620 F. Supp. 3d 1382, 139297 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (holding that "service via email on litigants located in China is not permitted by the Hague Convention" because China has objected to service "by postal channels," which, the Court reasoned, includes email). Because email service would violate the Hague Convention, service via email is not permissible under Rule 4(f)(3). Service via email would still be inappropriate even if the Hague Convention did not apply here. "The Hague Convention does not apply 'where the address of the person to be served with the document is not known.'" Advanced Access Content Sys. Licensing Adm'r, LLC v. Shen, No. 14-CV-1112, 2018 WL 4757939, at 4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2018) (citing Hague Convention art. 1). "Courts in this Circuit have found that an address is not known if the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to discover a physical address for service of process and was unsuccessful in doing so." Id. (collecting cases). Here, Plaintiff represents that he tried to mail the summons, complaint, and waiver of service forms to Wenchang at the address listed on the Walmart.com marketplace website, but the package was returned undelivered with a sticker indicating that the address was "unknown." ECF No. 89-1 at 2. Plaintiff also avers that Walmart.com gave him only that address for the defendant and that his attempts to find Wenchang on the internet "offer no corroborative information to verify that its actual physical address aligns with what is listed on its Walmart.com seller profile." Id. While Plaintiffs efforts arguably satisfy the "reasonable diligence" requirement, email service is still inappropriate because it is prohibited by Chinese law. If the Hague Convention does not apply, Rule 4(f)(2) would govern service here. Rule 4(f)(2) provides that a foreign individual or entity may be served as follows:"(2) if there is no internationally agreed means, or if an international agreement allows but does not specify other means, by a method that is reasonably calculated to give notice:(A) as prescribed by the foreign country's law for service in that country in an action in its courts of general jurisdiction;(B) as the foreign authority directs in response to a letter rogatory or letter of request; or(C) unless prohibited by the foreign country's law, by:(i) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally; or(ii) using any form of mail that the clerk addresses and sends to the individual and that requires a signed receipt"Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(2). None of these provisions permits email service here. Rule 4(f)(2)(A) does not apply because "in China, the courts themselves serve documents on litigants." See Smart Study Co., 620 F. Supp. 3d at 1398 ("To serve a party in China, an individual in a foreign country must apply to the Ministry of Justice. If the Ministry of Justice approves that request, the Ministry of Justice will forward the material to the Supreme People's Court of China, which will review the request and distribute it to a local court. The local court then arranges the service and sends proof of service back to the Ministry of Justice, which forwards that proof along to the serving party." (internal citations omitted)). Email service is not the method "prescribed by the foreign country's law for service in that country," and so Rule 4(f)(2)(A) is inapplicable. Rule 4(f)(2)(B) is also inapplicable because there is no indication that the foreign authority here has directed the use of email service "in response to a letter rogatory or letter of request." Finally, email service would not be proper under Rule 4(f)(2)(C) because, as mentioned above, email service is not permitted by Chinese law. See id. at 1399 ("Rule 4(f)(2)(C) only permits service via methods that are not 'prohibited by the foreign country's law.' Here, the law of the People's Republic of China prohibits foreign entities and individuals from serving litigants in China without the consent of the Ministry of Justice. And there is no dispute that Plaintiff did not apply to the Ministry of Justice to serve the defendants in this case. Accordingly, Plaintiff failed to serve the defendants via Rule 4(f)(2)(C)."). Thus, even if the Hague Convention did not apply here, this Court would not be empowered to permit email service on Wenchang.Thus, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion for an order authorizing service via email. The stay on Plaintiff's deadline to serve Wenchang is lifted, and Plaintiff must serve Wenchang in a manner permitted by Rule 4 by December 22, 2023. Signed by Judge Michael P Shea on 11/30/2023. (Bassali, David) (Entered: 11/30/2023)
11/20/23	Domesick v. JD E Commerce America Ltd 3:23-CV-00590 ( D. CT )	ORDER. The deadline to serve Defendant Wenchang Liuzuohu Shangmao Youxiangongsi is STAYED pending the Court's ruling on the 89 Motion for Order Authorizing Alternate Service of Process. Signed by Judge Michael P Shea on 11/20/2023.(Bassali, David) (Entered: 11/20/2023)