PTAB

IPR2015-00571

Itron Inc v. Certified Measurement LLC

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Petition
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1. Case Identification

2. Patent Overview

  • Title: Method and Apparatus for Certifying a Measurement
  • Brief Description: The ’648 patent discloses methods for acquiring and verifying a physical measurement from a sensor. The system combines the sensor measurement with other data, such as time and status information, and uses cryptographic operations to create a secure, "certified" measurement that can be verified at a later time.

3. Grounds for Unpatentability

Ground 1: Obviousness over Johnson and Hershey - Claims 142-143 are obvious over Johnson in view of Hershey.

  • Prior Art Relied Upon: Johnson (Patent 5,673,252) and Hershey (Patent 5,239,584).
  • Core Argument for this Ground:
    • Prior Art Mapping: Petitioner argued that Johnson, which disclosed a secure automatic meter reading (AMR) system, taught most limitations of the challenged claims. Johnson's system measures a physical parameter (utility consumption), associates it with time intervals, forms data packets ("augmented measurement"), and performs a cryptographic operation (a Cyclic Redundancy Check, or CRC) for data integrity. Hershey was argued to teach more robust encryption and authentication protocols specifically designed for utility monitoring applications, thus satisfying the "cryptographic operation" limitation more fully than Johnson's CRC. Petitioner asserted that Johnson's tamper and operational status sensors met the "corroborative datum" limitation of claim 143.
    • Motivation to Combine: A POSITA would combine Hershey's advanced security with Johnson's AMR system to improve upon Johnson's basic integrity check. Petitioner contended that as security threats to communication systems evolved, a POSITA would have been motivated to supplement Johnson's CRC with a more robust authentication protocol like that described in Hershey to prevent unauthorized access. Hershey was explicitly designed to improve such prior art automated meter systems.
    • Expectation of Success: Petitioner argued a POSITA would have had a high expectation of success, as combining known security protocols (from Hershey) with existing communication systems (like Johnson's) was a well-understood and common engineering practice to enhance system security and achieve predictable results.

Ground 2: Obviousness over Simmons and Peterson - Claims 142-143 are obvious over Simmons in view of Peterson.

  • Prior Art Relied Upon: Simmons (a 1988 IEEE article on data trustworthiness for treaty compliance) and Peterson (a 1982 U.S. Geological Survey report on a global seismograph network).
  • Core Argument for this Ground:
    • Prior Art Mapping: Petitioner argued that Simmons disclosed a conceptual framework for authenticating sensor data in a high-security context: seismic monitoring for nuclear test ban treaty verification. Simmons taught using tamper-resistant sensors, cryptographic protocols (including single-key and public-key systems), and combining sensor data with time for authentication. Peterson was argued to provide the necessary implementation details for such a system, describing a practical seismograph network that collected seismic data, added precise timing signals from external sources, included "state-of-health" flags ("corroborative datum"), and formatted this data into packets for continuous transmission.
    • Motivation to Combine: A POSITA tasked with building the secure sensor system described in Simmons would have looked to contemporaneous publications like Peterson for practical implementation guidance. Both documents addressed the same technical field (seismic monitoring) and referenced similar core hardware. Peterson's disclosure of data packet formatting, network protocols, and integration of timing and status data provided a clear and logical roadmap for implementing Simmons's cryptographic concepts in a working system.
    • Expectation of Success: The combination involved applying Simmons's authentication methods to the concrete system architecture described by Peterson. Petitioner contended a POSITA would expect success, as it involved integrating known cryptographic techniques with a well-described sensor network design to achieve the predictable result of a secure, verifiable data stream.

4. Key Claim Construction Positions

  • "certified measurement": Petitioner proposed the construction "a result of a cryptographic operation performed on at least a portion of an augmented measurement." This was based on distinguishing the term from "certifiable" used in related patents, arguing that "certified" implies the cryptographic operation has already been completed, not that the measurement is merely capable of being certified later.
  • "cryptographic operation": Petitioner argued for a broad construction: "an operation, such as an application of a one way function, encryption with an encryption key, or other data assurance methodology, that processes an augmented measurement." This interpretation was broad enough to encompass not only strong encryption but also simpler integrity checks like a CRC, which was central to the argument based on Johnson.
  • "corroborative datum": Petitioner proposed the construction "data indicative of a condition of a device." This interpretation was intended to cover tamper signals or system status flags, such as those disclosed in the Johnson and Peterson references, which are included alongside the primary physical measurement to provide context or verification of operational integrity.

5. Relief Requested

  • Petitioner requested institution of an inter partes review and cancellation of claims 142 and 143 of the ’648 patent as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. §103.