PTAB

IPR2020-00360

ScePter Canada Inc v. No Spill Inc

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Key Events
Petition
petition

1. Case Identification

2. Patent Overview

  • Title: Explosion Inhibiting Portable Fuel Container and Method of Inhibiting Explosions
  • Brief Description: The ’132 patent discloses a portable fuel container equipped with a “flash suppressor” (flame arrester). The claims recite specific dimensional and material properties for the flash suppressor, which is designed to prevent flashback explosions and retain a small amount of fuel to maintain a fuel-rich, non-combustible atmosphere within the container.

3. Grounds for Unpatentability

Ground 1: Obviousness over Stevick I & Stevick II - Claims 1-15 are obvious over Stevick I in view of Stevick II.

  • Prior Art Relied Upon: Stevick I (a 2010 report, "Portable Plastic Gasoline Container Explosions and Their Prevention") and Stevick II (a 2011 journal article, "Failure Analysis and Prevention of Fires and Explosions with Plastic Gasoline Containers").
  • Core Argument for this Ground:
    • Prior Art Mapping: Petitioner argued that Stevick I, a study on commercially available flame arresters, disclosed the "EAGLE" brand flame arrester which met nearly every dimensional limitation of independent claim 1. This included the overall length, internal volume, perforation size, total number of perforations, and percent open area. However, the EAGLE arrester was made of metal, not the claimed "synthetic resin material," and its material thickness did not meet the claimed "average length of the perforations" of at least 0.02 inches. Petitioner asserted that Stevick II, a follow-up publication by the same authors, remedied these deficiencies by disclosing a plastic flame arrester with a material thickness of 0.75 mm (approx. 0.0295 inches), which meets the claimed limitations.
    • Motivation to Combine: Petitioner contended a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSA) would combine the teachings to create a plastic version of the EAGLE arrester for several reasons. First, using a plastic arrester in a plastic container was known to reduce the risk of electrostatic build-up, a known explosion hazard with metal components. Second, a POSA would naturally consult Stevick II as it was a follow-up study by the same authors that expressly analyzed plastic arresters. Third, a POSA would adopt the thicker dimensions of the plastic arrester from Stevick II because plastic is inherently weaker than metal, and the disclosed thickness provided a known, functional level of durability.
    • Expectation of Success: A POSA would have a reasonable expectation of success because the combination involved substituting a known material (plastic) for another (metal) for predictable safety benefits and adjusting a single, well-understood dimension (thickness) to account for the material's known properties.

Ground 2: Obviousness over Stevick I, Stevick II, & Frost - Claims 16-18 are obvious over Stevick I in view of Stevick II and Frost.

  • Prior Art Relied Upon: Stevick I, Stevick II, and Frost (Patent 2,850,083).
  • Core Argument for this Ground:
    • Prior Art Mapping: This ground built upon the combination of Stevick I and Stevick II from Ground 1. Claims 16-18 add limitations requiring the flash suppressor’s perforations to be configured to retain a quantity of liquid fuel after the container is used, such that the retained fuel creates a fuel-air mixture too rich to support combustion. Petitioner argued that Frost explicitly taught this concept. Frost disclosed a perforated, honeycomb-like structure for lining fuel tanks that was designed to retain fuel in its cells via intermolecular forces (surface tension) when the tank is inverted. Frost stated this retained fuel creates a vapor mixture that is too rich to ignite. Petitioner asserted this teaching directly mapped onto the functional limitations of claims 16-18.
    • Motivation to Combine: Petitioner argued that a POSA, having arrived at the plastic flame arrester design from Stevick I and Stevick II, would be focused on preventing explosions. It was well-understood that maintaining a fuel-rich atmosphere was a primary method for achieving this. A POSA would have been motivated to look for known methods to achieve this fuel retention and would have found Frost, which taught using the inherent properties of a perforated structure to accomplish this exact goal. Modifying the arrester from the Stevick references to incorporate the fuel-retention principles of Frost would have been a logical next step to improve the safety and efficacy of the device.
    • Expectation of Success: The combination was presented as predictable, as Frost explained the underlying physics of fuel retention in perforated cells, giving a POSA a clear path and high expectation of success in applying this known safety principle to the existing flame arrester design.

4. Key Claim Construction Positions

  • "flash suppressor": Petitioner argued this term should be given its ordinary meaning to a POSA, which is "a perforated structure that prevents an ignition source such as a flame or spark from entering the tank of the portable fuel container." This construction was central to equating the "flame arresters" in the prior art with the claimed "flash suppressor."
  • "average length of the perforations": Petitioner proposed this term means the "average thickness of the flame suppressor walls." This construction was critical for mapping the "wire thickness" of the plastic flame arrester in Stevick II to the claimed length limitation, forming a key part of the obviousness argument in Ground 1.

5. Arguments Regarding Discretionary Denial

  • The petition noted that while the ’132 patent was asserted in a co-pending district court case, a schedule in that litigation had not yet been set. This fact was presented to argue that the litigation was not advanced, weighing against a potential discretionary denial under the Fintiv factors, as an inter partes review (IPR) would be a more efficient resolution.

6. Relief Requested

  • Petitioner requested the institution of an IPR and the cancellation of claims 1-18 of the ’132 patent as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. §103.